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ABSTRACT 
Managerial Prestige and Post-IPO Firm Performance: 
A Partially Mediated Model.  (August 2007) 
Christopher Ray Reutzel, B.S., Southern Utah University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. S. Trevis Certo 
 Dr. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
 
The role of top managers in shaping the performance of the firms that employ 
them represents a central issue to strategic management research.  Indeed, a substantial 
amount of research has examined potential linkages between the characteristics of top 
managers and firm performance.  However the empirical results of research in this area 
have been ambiguous.  This study attempts to theoretically and empirically extend 
research on the influence of top managers on firm performance by examining the 
relationship between managerial prestige and firm performance in the post-IPO context. 
Although upper echelons researchers have attempted to link top managers with 
firm performance in the past recent reviews of the upper echelons research note that little 
attention has been paid to top management characteristics other than those of top 
management team (TMT) heterogeneity, TMT size and TMT tenure.  Additionally, 
recent reviews also suggest the need to consider potential intervening mechanisms 
between TMT characteristics and firm performance.  This study addresses these two 
limitations of prior upper echelons research by examining the direct and indirect 
influences of managerial prestige on post-IPO firm performance. 
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In this study I develop a model which incorporates the resource based view and 
resource dependence theory with insights from upper echelons research and research on 
the IPO context.  Results for the model developed in this study suggest the following.  
First, executive undergraduate prestige is positively related to post-IPO firm growth.  
The other aspects of managerial prestige examined in this study were not found to 
influence post-IPO firm performance.  Second, the influence of the key external resource 
holders identified in this study, namely prestigious alliance partners and institutional 
investors with stable equity portfolios, were found to enhance firm survival rates, but 
were negatively associated with firm growth.  Third, executive undergraduate prestige 
was found to garner the support of prestigious alliance partners.  The remaining aspects 
of managerial prestige were not found to influence the support of prestigious alliance 
partners or dedicated institutional investors.  Finally, no support was found for 
prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional investors as mediators of the 
relationship between managerial prestige and post-IPO firm performance. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The influence of top managers on firm performance has long intrigued 
researchers from a variety of scholarly disciplines.  For instance, the seminal works of 
organizational theorists (Barnard, 1938; Child, 1972; Thompson, 1967), sociologists 
(Selznick, 1957), and economists (Penrose, 1959) all highlight the role of top executives 
in shaping organizational performance.  Complementing these perspectives, scholars 
from the field of strategy have developed the upper echelons perspective (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  According to the upper echelons 
perspective, a dominant coalition of top executives (i.e., the top management team 
(TMT)) makes decisions consistent with the cognitive bases of its members, which 
influence key organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Drawing upon the 
propositions of Hambrick and Mason (1984), scholars have examined potential links 
between TMT demographic characteristics and organizational outcomes.  These studies 
have generally argued that different aspects of TMT composition influence strategic 
decision making and firm performance (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick et al., 
1996). 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of the Academy of Management Journal. 
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While numerous studies have attempted to empirically link top executive 
characteristics and firm performance the ambiguous results of these studies suggest 
ample room for additional theorizing and empirical research in this arena still exists 
(Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Research suggests the need to 
integrate additional theoretical perspectives with the upper echelons perspective to 
explain the relationship between top executive characteristics and firm performance.  For 
instance, empirical studies by Daily et al. (2000) as well as Carpenter et al. (2001) 
demonstrate the value of incorporating the resource based view (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) with the upper echelons perspective. 
There exist a number of empirical studies examining the influence of top 
executive characteristics on firm performance, but relatively few studies have considered 
the influence of executives in the initial public offering (IPO) context.  Moreover, the 
limited number of studies that do examine the influence of executives in the IPO context 
tend to focus on relationships between executive characteristics and IPO pricing 
(Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Lester et al., 2006).  While these 
studies shed light into how top executives influence the initial pricing of IPOs, we 
currently lack knowledge about how top executives influence post-IPO firm 
performance. 
The paucity of studies linking top executives to post-IPO firm performance is 
surprising given that the IPO setting presents a unique context in which to examine the 
influence of top executives.  The IPO setting represents a transitional period in the life of 
a venture, which brings both benefits and challenges (Baron et al., 2001; Price 
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Waterhouse, 1995).  Although IPOs may provide a firm with additional financial 
resources, the IPO represents a shift from one institutional environment to another as the 
firm transitions from the private arena to public markets (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  The 
transformational nature of this shift often diverts firm resources from operating routines 
to firm reorientation and adaptation processes following the IPO, thereby increasing firm 
failure rates following this transition (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  This has led scholars to 
suggest that the possession of certain organizational resources, termed transformational 
shields (Miner et al., 1990), serve to insulate firms from the harmful effects of 
transitioning to the public arena (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).   
Top executives of newly public firms, as boundary spanning individuals who are 
ultimately responsible for the performance of their respective firms (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996), are likely to play a prominent role in overseeing this transition.  As 
such, the experiences and social ties that top executive embody may act as 
transformational shield during a newly public firms adaptation to the rigors of public 
trading.  However, with the exception of only a few studies (e.g., Chemmanur & Paeglis, 
2005; Fischer & Pollock, 2004), the influence of top executives during this period has 
been largely left unexplored.  This suggests the need to conduct additional investigation 
of the influence of top executives on post-IPO performance. 
A review of extant literature on top executives and firm performance also reveals 
that prior research on the performance consequences of top executive characteristics 
largely focuses on only a small set of executive demographic characteristics such as 
TMT heterogeneity, TMT size, and TMT average tenure.  This suggests there is a need 
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to expand the set of demographic characteristics examined in this area (Carpenter et al., 
2004).  While there exist a variety of potential top executive characteristics to examine, 
Carpenter and colleagues (2004) suggest the need for additional studies investigating the 
consequences of top executive managerial and business related experiences.  Managerial 
prestige (D’Aveni, 1990), represents a group of such executive characteristics that has 
received scant attention in extant empirical research. 
Purpose, Objectives and Research Questions 
Taken together, the need to integrate additional theoretical perspectives with the 
upper echelons perspective, the paucity of studies examining top executive influence in 
newly public firms, and the need to expand the set of top executive demographic 
characteristics beyond those commonly examined provide the backdrop for the current 
study.  Consequently, the purpose of this study is to develop a foundation for theory and 
empirical evidence regarding the influence of top executive managerial prestige in newly 
public firms.  In this study I integrate upper echelons theory with the resource based 
view and resource dependency theory to develop and empirically test a model of top 
executive influence on the performance of newly public firms. 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the mechanisms through which 
managerial prestige influences the performance of newly public firms.  A limited 
number of studies have examined the direct effects of managerial prestige on firm 
performance (i.e., Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005; D’Aveni, 1990).  In this study, I add to 
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this small body of research by examining the direct effects of managerial prestige on 
post-IPO firm performance.  Prior research has documented the influence of managerial 
prestige in garnering the support of external resource holders (i.e., Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Higgins & Gulati, 2003, 2006).  Yet, there are no studies that 
demonstrate that managerial prestige influences firm performance outcomes through the 
external resource holder support it engenders.  Specifically, I examine the influence of 
managerial prestige on post-IPO firm performance through the support of prestigious 
strategic alliance partners and dedicated institutional investors.  Establishing links 
among managerial prestige, external resource holder support and firm performance may 
help researchers and practitioners understand how top executives influence firm 
performance. 
The model developed in this study suggests that managerial prestige influences 
the performance of newly public firms in two ways.  First, managerial prestige 
influences top executive ability to manage firm adaptation to the public arena.  Second, 
managerial prestige influences the performance of newly public firm by facilitating 
access to support and resources from key external stakeholders which serve to shield 
newly public firms from the potentially deleterious effects of adapting to the rigors of 
public markets. 
Specifically, in this dissertation research I develop a model of managerial 
prestige’s influence on post-IPO firm growth and failure.  Firm growth and failure are 
the focus of this study for three reasons.  First, relatively few empirical studies have 
examined the growth or failure rates of newly public firms (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  
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Second, obtaining the financial capital necessary to fuel firm growth and survival are 
often cited as a reason for undergoing the IPO process by both practitioners and 
researchers (Brau & Fawcett, 2006).  Third, achieving high levels of sustained growth 
represents a top concern among CEOs and board chairs (Huston & Sakkab, 2006).  In 
this study I attempt to address the following research questions: 
1. Does managerial prestige influence post-IPO firm performance? 
2. Do dedicated institutional investors and/or prestigious alliance partners shield 
IPO firms from the deleterious effects of transitioning into the public arena? 
3. Does managerial prestige influence post-IPO firm performance by garnering 
the support of prestigious alliance partners and/or dedicated institutional 
investors? 
Potential Contributions 
This research has the potential to make multiple contributions to organizational 
theory, and strategic management research.  Prior research examining the influence of 
top managers on firm performance has principally focused on aspects of TMT 
composition such as TMT size, TMT heterogeneity, TMT tenure, and TMT average age 
(Carpenter et al., 2004).  In contrast, this study explores the firm performance 
consequences of managerial prestige.  Additionally, prior research examining the firm 
performance implications of managerial prestige has focused on large, established 
corporations (see D’Aveni, 1990).  Thus, this study extends prior research linking upper 
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echelons characteristics to firm performance by examining the effects of managerial 
prestige on post-IPO firm performance.  As such, this study enriches our understanding 
of the influence of top managers. 
Prior studies examining the influence of top manager characteristics on firm 
performance have also principally considered the firm performance and resource 
procurement consequences of managerial characteristics separately.  By integrating 
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) with managerial 
prestige research this study develops a partially mediated model of managerial prestige’s 
influence on firm performance outcomes.  Consequently, this study represents one of the 
first to empirically determine whether managerial characteristics influence firm 
performance through the support of external resource holders they may engender.  By 
considering the partially mediated effects of managerial prestige on firm performance, 
the model developed in this study contributes to our knowledge of how top executive 
influence firm performance. 
Finally, the model developed in this dissertation research extends the work of 
Miner et al. (1990) and Fischer and Pollock (2004) by identifying managerial prestige as 
an additional organizational characteristic that protects firms from the deleterious effects 
of transformational change in two ways.  First, the model developed in this study posits 
that prestigious top executive possess social and human capital that enables them to 
effectively manage the adaptation and reorientation processes typical of IPO transition.  
Second, prestigious top executives possess social and human capital that provides their 
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firms greater access to the support of key external resource holders as they adapt to 
public markets. 
Research Methods Overview 
This study utilizes a sample of firms undergoing their IPO during the 1997 
calendar year to test the theory and hypotheses developed in this study.  I selected the 
1997 calendar year because a relatively large number of firms conducted their IPOs that 
year and also because this time frame precedes the Internet bubble and bust.  Consistent 
with prior research, I track each sample firm for up to 5 years following its IPO to 
develop measures of post-IPO firm performance (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Welbourne 
& Andrews, 1996).  I draw the data for this study from multiple archival sources.  The 
initial sample of IPO firms and data on IPO performance is taken from the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues data base.  I examine IPO prospectuses in 
order to collect data on TMT managerial and business experiences.  I collect firm growth 
data from Compustat and firm survival data from CRSP.  I collect data on firm strategic 
alliance formation from SDC Mergers and Acquisitions data base.  Finally, I gather data 
on institutional ownership from CDA/Spectrum Institutional Ownership Database from 
Thomson Financial Publishing.  In order to test the theory and hypotheses developed in 
this dissertation research I utilize random coefficients growth modeling (Bliese & 
Ployhart, 2002; Singer, 1998), Cox proportional hazards models (Allison, 1984; 
Yamaguchi, 1991), random effects time series cross-sectional negative binomial 
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regression models, and random effects time series cross sectional generalized least 
squares regression. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized in the following 
manner.  Chapter II provides reviews of the literature relevant to this study.  Chapter III 
integrates the literature reviewed to develop theory and hypotheses.  Chapter IV details 
the research methods used to empirically test the hypotheses generated in Chapter III.  
Chapter V presents the results of the empirical tests of the theory and hypotheses 
developed in Chapter III.  Finally, Chapter VI provides a discussion of conclusions and 
limitations of this research, as well as implications for future research and practice. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide readers with an understanding of 
literature relevant to the theory and hypotheses developed in the next chapter regarding 
the influence of managerial prestige on post-IPO firm performance.  Accordingly, the 
literature review presented in this chapter discusses theory and empirical evidence in 
three areas.  First, I review literature on top executive demographic characteristics and 
firm performance.  Second, I discuss the theory and research on managerial prestige.  
Third, I present a discussion of the IPO context and briefly review research on post-IPO 
firm growth and failure. 
Top Executives and Firm Performance 
Research on the role of top executives in shaping firm performance can be traced 
back to the beginnings of organizational theory (Barnard, 1938; Child, 1972).  The 
centrality of top executives in shaping firm outcomes was also explicitly recognized in 
early conceptualizations of strategy (see Hoskisson et al., 1999 for a review).  More 
recently, Pitcher and Smith (2001:1) note, “There are few more important subjects to 
strategy scholars, or for that matter practitioners, than the link between people at the 
strategic apex of the organization and that organization’s performance.”  The validity of 
this statement is reflected in the rapid emergence and substantial amount research 
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addressing the question of whether top executives matter (Certo et al., 2006; Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1996). 
The upper echelons perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) specifically 
addresses this question.  The upper echelons perspective suggests that organizations are 
a reflection of top executives and the decisions they make.  Central to the upper echelons 
research is the utilization of demographic characteristics.  As such, a central thrust of 
upper echelons research stream centers on examining potential relationships between top 
executive demographic characteristics and firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). 
While numerous studies have attempted to link the characteristics to of top 
managers to firm performance, the collective empirical results of research in this area 
have been ambiguous (Carpenter et al., 2004; Certo et al., 2006).  Recent reviews of 
research on the performance implications of executive characteristics have suggest 
several potential explanations for the ambiguous nature of the findings in this stream of 
research.  For instance, some suggest the lack of support for a consistent relationship 
between executive characteristics and firm performance outcomes may be in part a result 
of prior research’s focus on a relatively narrow set of executive characteristics 
comprised primarily of TMT educational experience, functional background, age, tenure, 
and size (Carpenter et al., 2004). 
Related to this issue is an emerging body of research that suggests the need to 
incorporate additional theoretical perspectives with upper echelons theory in order to 
expand the set of executive characteristics considered when examining the relationship 
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between top executive characteristics and firm performance.  For instance, empirical 
studies by Daily et al. (2000), as well as Carpenter et al. (2001) demonstrate the value of 
incorporating the resource based view (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) with upper 
echelons theory to examine the influence of CEO and TMT international assignment 
experience on firm performance. 
Another approach to addressing the ambiguity of findings regarding TMT 
characteristics and firm performance suggests that researchers need to explore the 
‘black-box’ of the relationship between TMT characteristics and firm performance is to 
open the black box (Certo et al., 2006; Lawrence, 1997).  In order to begin to open the 
‘black box’ Certo and colleagues (2006) posit that researchers begin to consider the role 
of intervening constructs between TMT characteristics and firm performance outcomes. 
Managerial Prestige 
Managerial prestige represents one set of top executive characteristics that have 
received substantially less attention with regard to their influence on firm performance.  
All top executives possess an element of managerial prestige (D’Aveni, 1990; Domoff, 
1967; Dye, 1983).  For instance, Mitchell (1982) discusses three types of status:  social 
status, which refers to the standing of an individual in general society; occupational 
prestige, which is the value placed upon an occupation by society in general; and 
organizational status, which refers to the where one fits within the hierarchy of an 
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organization.  Senior executives, in general, rank highly on each of these status 
characteristics in comparison to general society (D’Aveni, 1990). 
Managerial prestige is defined by D’Aveni (1990:121) as, “the property of 
having status.”  Thus status characteristics are central to the theoretical underpinnings of 
managerial prestige.  Research on status and the origins of status characteristics is 
largely rooted in the sociological literature addressing the nature of status characteristics 
theory (Berger & Webster, 2006).  Drawing upon research in this area, D’Aveni 
(1990:121) suggests that “status indicates membership in an elite social circle.”  In a 
descriptive sense, status refers to an actor’s position within a social system based upon a 
set of relevant dimensions (Deephouse, 1998).  In an evaluative sense, status refers to 
the ranking of an actor according to the values of a social system (Deephouse, 1998). 
While not specifically stated, prior research on upper echelons prestige implies 
that managerial prestige primarily resides in the stock of relevant human and social 
capital possessed by firm executives (Certo, 2003; D’Aveni, 1990).  Accordingly, the 
theoretical underpinnings of managerial prestige also stem from research on human 
capital and social capital. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
In this section I review the theoretical underpinnings of managerial prestige and 
its influence on organizational outcomes.  In doing so, I review three theoretical 
perspectives, each of which speak to the potential for managerial prestige to influence 
firm performance.  Specifically, in the following sections I discuss status characteristics 
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theory (Berger et al., 1980; Webster & Foschi, 1988), human capital theory (Becker, 
1964, 1975), and social capital theory (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988). 
Status Characteristics Theory.  The theoretical roots of managerial prestige, by 
virtue of its link to status, stem from research on status characteristics (Berger et al., 
1980).  According to status characteristics theory, individuals form cognitive 
expectations of actor performance based upon actor status characteristics (Berger et al., 
2002; Webster & Foschi, 1988).  Due to bounded rationality, when faced with 
uncertainty, individuals may ascribe different values, skills and abilities to individuals 
and organizations based upon these performance expectations (Berger et al., 1980; 
Berger & Webster, 2006; Webster & Foschi, 1988).  With regard to managerial prestige 
D’Aveni (1990:124) notes, “the general assumption is that going to the proper schools, 
having impressive prior experience and associating with the right people indicate higher 
status, aggregated prestige and skill.”  Thus, managerial prestige acts as a cue to decision 
makers shaping their perceptions of managerial competence, trustworthiness, and 
quality. 
Studies utilizing a status characteristics perspective suggest that the influence of 
managerial prestige on external resource holder support extends beyond simply implying 
managerial quality.  Managerial prestige also influences external resource holder support 
by signaling organizational legitimacy to potential external exchange partners (Certo, 
2003; D’Aveni, 1990).  As boundary spanners who are highly visible to external 
constituencies, prestigious managers contribute to the legitimacy of the firms that 
employ them (D’Aveni, 1990; Cohen & Dean, 2005).  Organizational legitimacy 
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embodies a key factor in garnering the external support and resources required for 
organizational survival and growth (Stinchcombe, 1965; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). 
Additionally, prestigious managers have substantial incentive to avoid affiliation 
with low-quality firms in order to protect their reputations (Blau, 1964; Cohen & Dean, 
2005; Podolny, 1994).  Accordingly, prior research suggests that external resource 
holders may be influenced by the presence of prestigious managers in a firm because 
they recognize this incentive and trust the ability of prestigious managers to discern firm 
quality and viability as a result of their perceived expertise (Cohen & Dean, 2005; 
Stuart, 1998; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Managerial prestige may also influence external resource holders by transferring 
status to exchange partners (Podolny, 1993, 1994).  As Podolny (1993:833) notes, “ties 
to higher-status actors enhance the prestige with which one is viewed.”  As a result of 
the view that prestigious managers and high-status organizations will avoid association 
with low quality actors, prestige is transferred to exchange partners when such 
affiliations are publicized (Stuart, 1999).  Thus, affiliations with firms who employ 
prestigious managers can be status enhancing for external resource holders (Podolny, 
1993, 1994; Stuart, 1999).  As such managerial prestige often provides a firm with 
greater opportunities to form exchange relationships (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Additionally, the benefits provided by affiliations with high-status firms may cause 
external resource holders to concede contractual terms to firms who employ prestigious 
managers in order to gain such affiliations (D’Aveni, 1990; Podolny, 1994; Stuart, 
1999). 
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Social Capital Theory.  D’Aveni (1990) argues that managerial prestige stems 
from top executive social ties and associations.  Consequently, while D’Aveni (1990) 
does not use the term social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988) per se, in 
essence he suggests that managerial prestige stems in part from the social capital 
possessed by top executives (Certo, 2003).  Social capital refers to the, “sum of the 
actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998:243).  Similarly, other scholars suggest that social capital represents, “the set of 
resources, tangible or virtual, that accrue to an actor through the actor’s social 
relationships, facilitating the attainment of goals” (Leenders & Gabbay, 1999:2) Thus, 
social capital represents a quality of relationships rather than individuals (Burt, 1992, 
1997; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
Social capital theory suggests that individuals utilize their networks to form 
linkages with other individuals and institutions that provide access to information and 
resources (Adler & Kwon, 2002).  The social ties of top executives are important 
because they facilitate exchange and acquisition of information and resources 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  Multiple studies have demonstrated the role of 
executive social capital in shaping firm performance.  For example, Collins and Clark 
(2003) investigated the relationship between top management team external social 
networks and firm performance.  They found that the range and strength of top 
management team external social ties were positively related to both firm sales growth 
and stock performance.  Shane and Stuart (2002) examined the influence of founder 
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social ties in the new venture context.  Utilizing a sample of 134 university startups these 
authors found that founder direct and indirect relationships with venture investors were 
positively related to new venture funding and survival. 
Human Capital Theory.  D’Aveni (1990) also suggests that managerial prestige 
stems from top executive experience.  Thus, while D’Aveni (1990) does not use the term 
human capital (Becker, 1964, 1975; Coleman, 1988) specifically, he essentially suggests 
that managerial prestige also resides in the stock of human capital possessed by top 
executives (Certo, 2003).  Human capital refers to the expertise, skill, experience, and 
knowledge that reside within an individual or group (Becker, 1964; Burt, 1992; 
Coleman, 1988). 
Human capital theory suggests that individuals and groups possess a form of 
capital that is derived from the skills and knowledge they develop through their 
experiences (Flamholtz & Lacey, 1981).  The human capital of top executives is 
commonly viewed as stemming from their educational and work experiences 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  Becker (1975) suggests there are two forms of human 
capital:  general and specific.  General human capital resides in individual skills and 
abilities that have value in a variety of contexts (Becker, 1975; Certo, 2003).  
Educational background, and work experience represent examples of general forms 
human capital (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gimeno et al., 1997; Hitt et al., 2001).  
Contrastingly, specific human capital represents skill and abilities whose value is 
contingent on the context in which they are employed.  Industry experience and firm 
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experience are examples of specific human capital (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gimeno et 
al., 1997). 
Research demonstrates the potential role of executive human capital in shaping 
organizational performance (Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
For example, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1986) examined the influence of leader 
experience on organizational performance in the context of the National Basketball 
Association (NBA).  These authors found that the ability and experiences of new NBA 
coaches were positively related to the subsequent performance of their new teams.  More 
recently, Carpenter et al. (2001) examine the influence of CEO international experience 
on the performance of U.S. multinationals.  They find that CEO international experience 
is positively related to firm performance.  The also found that the positive relationship 
between CEO international experience was strengthened by the international experience 
of non-CEO TMT members. 
Consequences of Managerial Prestige:  Empirical Evidence 
Having reviewed the theoretical underpinnings of managerial prestige, I now 
shift my focus to empirical evidence regarding the consequences of managerial prestige.  
While senior executives are members of the corporate elite who possess an element of 
managerial prestige, they are not all equal with regard to their level of managerial 
prestige they posses (D’Aveni, 1990; Useem & Karabel, 1986).  As such, researchers 
have utilized a variety of executive characteristics to stratify top executives and link 
managerial prestige differences to multiple organizational outcomes.  In the section that 
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follows I review empirical studies and summarize the relationships documented in these 
studies between managerial prestige and a variety of organizational outcomes. 
Managerial Prestige and Bankruptcy.  D’Aveni (1990) was one of the first to 
suggest that managerial prestige influences organizational performance.  Specifically, 
D’Aveni (1990) posits that managerial prestige indicates managerial competence, 
credibility and trustworthiness, which contributes to creditor perceptions of firm 
trustworthiness and viability.  D’Aveni (1990) further suggests that managerial prestige 
contributes to firm survival by creating creditor faith in a firm and its management.  
Utilizing a matched sample design, D’Aveni (1990) examines the influence of 
managerial prestige on the likelihood of bankruptcy.  In partial support of his thesis, 
D’Aveni (1990) found that two (political and board connections) out of five managerial 
prestige characteristics were negatively related to the likelihood of firm bankruptcy in 
his matched sample of 57 large U.S. firms.  Furthermore, D’Aveni (1990) found that 
failing firms attempted to increase their prestige three to four years prior to bankruptcy, 
and also found that those firms also experienced a ‘bailout’ of prestigious managers in 
the two years prior to bankruptcy. 
Managerial Prestige and Alliance Formation.  Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 
(1996) drew upon managerial prestige in part to posit a link between top executive 
characteristics and alliance formation.  With regard to managerial prestige, Eisenhardt 
and Schoonhoven (1996) argue that the prior industry and managerial experiences of 
TMT members signal managerial skill and trustworthiness as well as provide social ties 
to potential alliance partners.  In line with this view, they furthered argued that the 
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amount of TMT prior industry experience and as well as the amount of prior TMT 
managerial experience would positively relate to the rate of firm alliance formation.  
Utilizing a sample of semi-conductor firms, they found support for their arguments.  
Specifically they found that both the amount of prior TMT industry experience and the 
amount of prior TMT managerial experience were positively related to the rate of firm 
alliance formation. 
Managerial Prestige and Underwriter Prestige.  Higgins and Gulati (2003) 
explored the influence of managerial prestige on underwriter prestige.  Specifically, they 
examined the influence of upper echelons value chain affiliations (e.g., ties to firm 
suppliers or buyers) on underwriter prestige.  Higgins and Gulati (2003) found that the 
prominence and range of upper echelons affiliations were positively related to 
underwriter prestige in a sample of IPO stage bio-technology firms.  The results of their 
study also demonstrated that technological uncertainty moderates the relationship 
between upper echelons affiliations and underwriter prestige. 
Managerial Prestige and IPO Performance.  The influence of managerial prestige 
on external stakeholder support has also been examined by gauging investor reactions to 
initial public offerings.  The IPO context has proven a valuable context in which to 
examine the influence of managerial prestige in contributing to organizational legitimacy 
given the uncertainty investors face regarding firm ability to adapt to the rigors of public 
trading (Certo, 2003).  Three types of investor behavior have been linked to managerial 
prestige possessed by a firm at the time of its IPO:  IPO under pricing, IPO investor 
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valuations, and institutional investing in IPOs.  In the paragraphs that follow I review 
extant research linking managerial prestige to IPO outcomes. 
Cohen and Dean (2005) examine the signaling influence of managerial 
characteristics on IPO under pricing.  The notion that top management team 
characteristics signal IPO issuer legitimacy thus reducing IPO under pricing represents 
the central premise of Cohen and Dean’s (2005) study.  In support of their hypothesis, 
the authors found that TMT legitimacy was negatively related to IPO under pricing in a 
sample of U.S. IPO’s undertaken from 1998 to 1999. 
Similarly, Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) examine the influence of various 
indicators of managerial quality on aspects of IPO firm performance.  The central thesis 
of their study posits that managerial quality has a positive impact on both IPO and post-
IPO firm performance.  Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) test this thesis on a sample of 
firms that undertook IPOs from 1993-1996.  They found that managerial quality was 
positively related to IPO offer size, underwriter prestige, institutional investment, long-
term IPO stock returns and post-IPO return on assets.  Also, Chemmanur and Paeglis 
(2005) found a negative relationship between managerial quality and underwriting 
expenses and IPO under pricing. 
More recently, Lester et al. (2006) examine the influence of TMT prestige on 
IPO investor valuations.  Extending the logic of D’Aveni (1990) to the IPO context, the 
authors argue that TMT prestige signals organizational legitimacy and access to social 
resources, which may influence investor perceptions of IPO firm potential.  Partially 
supportive of their hypotheses, Lester and colleagues (2006) find a positive relationship 
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between firm TMT educational prestige and IPO investor valuations in their sample of 
IPOs undertaken during 1996 and 1997. 
Finally, Higgins and Gulati (2006) examine the influence of managerial 
affiliations on institutional investment in an IPO firm.  Consistent with prior studies 
examining the signaling effects of managerial affiliations, Higgins and Gulati (2006) 
posit that managerial resources signal firm legitimacy, which is likely to influence 
external party perceptions of firm quality and potential.  Specifically, Higgins and Gulati 
(2006) examine the influence of TMT employment affiliations (upstream or downstream 
in the value chain) as well as the role experience of core TMT members (CEO, CFO and 
Chief Scientific Officer) on the number of quality institutional investors that invest in a 
firm at the time of their IPO.  These authors find that prominent downstream TMT 
employment affiliations, TMT employment affiliation diversity and prior role experience 
of the Chief Scientific Officer are positively related to the number of quality institutional 
investors investing in an IPO firm in their sample of biotechnology firms. 
Managerial Prestige and Post-IPO Performance.  Prior research has also link 
some aspects of managerial prestige to post-IPO firm performance.  Chemmanur and 
Paeglis (2005) argue that higher quality managers enhance post-IPO operating 
performance because they are better able to select and implement investment projects.  
Regarding managerial prestige they found that the percentage of TMT members 
possessing an MBA, and the proportion of TMT members with prior TMT experience in 
other firms were positively related to post-IPO operating performance. 
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Initial Public Offerings 
While all firms require the support of critical external stakeholders (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967), IPOs represent a critical and unique transition in the 
life cycle of a firm (Certo et al., 2001b; Daily et al., 2005).  For firms undertaking IPOs, 
acquiring the support of key members of the external environment is particularly salient 
to firm survival and growth.  In order to relate top executives and their characteristics to 
post-IPO firm performance it is necessary to have a basic knowledge of the IPO process, 
prior research on post-IPO firm performance.  Consequently, in the following sections I 
review 1) how the IPO process comes to pass, 2), the motivations for undergoing the 
IPO process, 3) the liabilities associated with transitioning from privately held to 
publicly traded, the paucity of studies examining post-IPO firm failure and growth. 
IPO Process 
Firms undertaking IPOs adhere to a relatively standardized processes (Ellis et al., 
2000).  The descriptions of the IPO process by Certo (2003) and Daily et al. (2003a) are 
succinct and thorough.  A review of their accounts of the IPO process suggests that there 
are several steps privately held firms take as they make the transition to the public arena.  
First, the executives of privately held firms enlist the service of an investment banker.  
Investment bankers play a central role in guiding privately held firms through the IPO 
process.  Next, privately held firm managers, owners, investment bankers, and legal 
counsel work together to prepare a firm’s prospectus and registration statement 
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(Anderson et al., 1995).  After the filing of a firm’s registration statement with the SEC, 
investment bankers and firm managers arrange to meet with potential institutional 
investors in order to create and gauge investor interest in the firm’s offering (Edy, 2000; 
Lashinsky, 1999; Ritter, 1998).  After querying institutional investor interest, investment 
bankers determine a final offer price, which represents the price at which a firm will 
begin trading when it first goes public.  Finally, shares of a firm’s stock are listed on 
public stock exchanges and are purchased by public market investors. 
IPO Motivations 
While there exist multiple potential motivations for undergoing the IPO process 
(see Brau & Fawcett, 2006 for a review), two primary motivations are often cited in the 
finance, strategic management, and entrepreneurship fields.  First, entrepreneurs and 
owners of privately held firms may choose to undergo the IPO process in order to 
diversify their holdings (Ritter & Welch, 2002; Zingales, 1995).  By taking their private 
firms public, owners and entrepreneurs create a public market for their holdings.  
Creating a public market for a firm facilitates the conversion and diversification of firm 
ownership holdings (Mello & Parsons, 2000; Zingales, 1995). 
Second, IPOs provide firms with a means of obtaining the capital funding 
necessary to expand and grow (Choe et al., 1993; Jain & Kini, 1994; Lowry, 2003; 
Mikkelson et al., 1997).  As privately held firms grow, they may find it increasingly 
undesirable or difficult to finance their growth with debt (Rock, 1986).  As a result, they 
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may turn to equity markets in order to convert their debt to equity as well as avoid the 
covenant restrictions often associated with commercial debt (Rock, 1986). 
Post-IPO Liabilities 
While firms successfully navigating the IPO process may achieve a number of 
benefits (Husick & Arrington, 1998), the IPO process is not a panacea.  IPO firms, by 
definition, face the demands of being publicly traded for the first time.  Drawing on 
Aldrich’s (1999) framework of transformational change, Fischer and Pollock (2004) 
suggest that the transition from a privately to publicly held company induces newly 
public firms to make changes in three key areas.  First, moving from the private to public 
arena often requires a change of goals.  For instance, public investors may be less 
tolerant of performance volatility and have shorter time horizons than private investors 
(Price Waterhouse, 1995).  This suggests that managers of newly public firms must learn 
to adapt to the objectives and challenges presented by public shareholders (Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004).  Second, firms are likely to undergo changes in firm boundaries 
following the IPO as managers utilize IPO proceeds to enter new product and geographic 
markets (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  Finally, newly public firms experience changes in 
their activity systems that are costly and require organizational learning (Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004).  These changes stem from the increased formal governance procedures 
and reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (Husick & 
Arrington, 1998; Price Waterhouse, 1995).  A study by PWC Global conducted in 2000 
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estimated that the average direct costs of a firm being publicly traded constitute 
approximately ten percent of firm profits at the time of the IPO (Benninga et al., 2005). 
This discussion suggests that the changes required of firms that move from the 
public to private arena are substantial.  Examination of post-IPO firm performance 
provides further evidence of the potential perils of the IPO process.  Research by Ritter 
(1991) as well as Ritter and Welch (2002), for example, suggests that the market returns 
of IPO firms are substantially less than their similarly sized industry peers.  Furthermore, 
Fama and French (2004) recently show that the survival rates of newly listed firms are 
substantially less than those of more seasoned firms.  More specifically, Fama and 
French (2004:230) find that seasoned firms have delisting rates of 17.9 percent from 
1980-1991, while new issues (IPO firms) have 44.2 percent delisting rate from 1980-
1991.  In summary the IPO process presents firms with several unique challenges. 
Post-IPO Growth and Failure 
Despite the many unique practical and theoretical linkages between the IPO 
context and firm growth and survival, surprisingly few studies have examined the 
survival and growth patterns of newly public firms.  For instance, Fischer and Pollock 
(2004) in their brief review of research examining IPO firm survival note only three 
studies (Jain & Kini, 2000; Platt, 1995; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996) that examined 
IPO firm failure.  In my own search of the literature on IPO firm survival, I found three 
additional studies that model post-IPO firm survival (Bhabra & Pettway, 2003; Hensler 
et al., 1997; Jain & Kini, 1994). 
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My search of the literature also revealed a paucity of studies examining the 
growth of firms immediately following their IPOs.  More specifically, I found only three 
studies that predict the growth of IPO firms (Brau et al., 2004; Kor, 2003; Robinson, 
1999).  This is surprising given the fact that procuring the financial resources necessary 
for growth represents a primary reason provided for firms undergoing the IPO process 
(Brau & Fawcett, 2006).  In sum, relatively few studies empirically examine the survival 
and growth of newly public firms, of which only one (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) 
expressly addresses the challenges presented to adapting to the public arena.   
Summary 
The preceding sections highlight several important points.  First, understanding 
the relationship between top manager characteristics and firm performance is important 
for both researchers and practitioners.  Prior empirical findings regarding such 
relationships are inconsistent.  Consequently, some suggest the need to integrate other 
theoretical perspectives with upper echelons theory to predict firm performance.  
Second, prior research suggests that managerial prestige increases firm access to key 
environmental resources and support by signaling managerial quality and organizational 
legitimacy as well as transferring status to potential exchange partners.  Yet extant 
research does not demonstrate that managerial prestige influences firm performance 
through the resource holder support it engenders.  Rather, the prior empirical research 
reviewed in this chapter examines the consequences of managerial prestige directly by 
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operationalizing resource holder support and firm performance with the same measure.  
As such, I am unaware of any empirical study that has examined how resource holder 
support might mediate the influence the managerial prestige on firm performance.  
Third, relatively few studies examine the influence of top managers on post-IPO firm 
performance, none of which examine the relationship between managerial prestige and 
post-IPO firm growth and survival.  The IPO represent a transformational event in the 
life cycle of publicly traded firms, and as such it presents researchers with a unique 
context in which to consider the influence of top manager characteristics on firm 
performance.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework to examine the influence 
of managerial prestige on post-IPO firm growth and survival.  The research reviewed in 
Chapters II provides the foundation for the theory and hypotheses developed in this 
chapter.  The theory developed in this chapter integrates the resource based view, 
resource dependence theory, and upper echelons theory to develop a model of 
managerial prestige’s influence on post-IPO firm performance. 
In the sections that following I do the following.  First, I develop theory and 
hypotheses that explain why executive prestigious educational experience, prestigious 
firm managerial experience, and prestigious firm external directorate experience 
represent key aspects of managerial prestige in the post-IPO firm performance.  
Specifically, I utilize the resource based view to argue that executive elite educational 
experience, prestigious firm managerial experience, and prestigious firm external 
directorate experience represent valuable, rare and inimitable sources of human and 
social capital as IPO firms make the transition to the rigors of public trading.  As such, I 
posit that these executive characteristics represent relevant stocks of managerial human 
and social capital in the post IPO context and therefore fit the definition of managerial 
prestige articulated in Chapter II.  Second, I develop theory and hypotheses that 
identifies prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional investors as key 
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external resource holders in the post-IPO context.  In doing so, I discuss how these key 
external resource holders provide newly public firms with information and resources 
salient to the IPO transition.  Third, I draw upon resource dependency theory to suggest 
that executives who possess the aforementioned aspects of managerial prestige (i.e., 
prestigious educational credentials, prestigious firm managerial experiences, and 
prestigious firm external directorate experiences) are likely to influence external 
constituency perceptions of managerial ability to deal with the challenges faced by 
newly public firms.  This, in turn, is likely to facilitate firm access to the support of key 
external resource holders, thus easing the transition made by IPO firms into the public 
arena.  Finally, I hypothesize that the support and resources provided by prestigious 
alliance partners and dedicated institutional investors partially mediates the influence of 
the previously identified aspects of managerial prestige on post-IPO firm performance.   
Post-IPO Firm Performance:  Firm Growth and Failure 
The executives that lead newly public firms generally have substantial 
motivation to pursue both firm growth and survival.  Firm growth and survival embody 
desirable and interrelated firm outcomes (Baum & Mezias, 1993; Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Brush et al., 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Mishina et al., 2004; Penrose, 
1959).  Through growth, firms achieve the size necessary to achieve economies of scale 
(Chandler, 1990).  The increased size that growth brings also serves to enhance firm 
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visibility, legitimacy, and survival prospects (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Zimmerman & 
Zeitz, 2002). 
A recent survey of CEOs and board chairs reveals that the sustaining high rates 
of growth represents a top concern among members of the upper echelons (Huston & 
Sakkab, 2006).  Additionally, firm growth and survival influence executive career 
prospects (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Cannella et al., 1995) and board appointments 
(Fama, 1980; Johnson et al., 1996).  Finally, acquiring the financial capital necessary to 
expand a firm’s operations is often offered as a rationale for undergoing the IPO process 
by both researchers and practitioners (6 & Fawcett, 2006).   
The IPO and Transformational Change 
While newly public firms and their executives may have substantial motivation 
to pursue growth opportunities and ensure firm survival, the transformational nature of 
the transition from the private to public arenas presents them with several challenges in 
the pursuit of these ends (Certo, 2003; Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  In particular, Fischer 
and Pollock (2004) suggest that newly public firms are often required to make changes 
to three key organizational aspects:  organizational goals, organizational boundaries, and 
organization activity systems.  These changes result in the disruption of organizational 
routines (Miner et al., 1990), which divert resources from operational and strategic 
activities to adaptation and reorientation processes (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  As a 
result of the diversion of resources from normal operations, newly public firms are likely 
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to face increased failure rates (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) and diminished growth 
prospects.  The difficulties of transitioning from the private to public arenas are 
evidenced by the fact that many firms under perform and eventually fail following their 
IPOs (Fama & French, 2004).  Indeed, Fischer and Pollock (2004) suggest that the IPO 
event represents a transformational event in the life cycle of a firm that resets the 
organizational clock re-exposing it to the liability of newness.  This suggests that, in a 
manner similar to that which occurs at firm founding (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990), firm characteristics at the time of the IPO transition are likely to have an enduring 
effect on firm performance (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). 
Managerial Prestige in the Post-IPO Context 
As noted in Chapter II, prior research on managerial prestige provides three key 
insights regarding the definition of managerial prestige.  First, D’Aveni (1990) states 
that that managerial prestige represents the property of possessing status.  Second, status 
refers to an actor’s position within a social system based upon a set of relevant 
dimensions (Deephouse, 1998).  Third, managerial prestige stems from the stock of 
human and social capital possessed by top managers (Certo, 2003; D’Aveni, 1990).  
Taken together these three insights suggest that managerial prestige represents the 
relevant stock of human and social capital possessed by a firm’s TMT. 
Drawing upon these insights, in the sections that follow I endeavor to identify 
aspects of executive characteristics that meet the criteria of managerial prestige in the 
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post-IPO context by facilitating the transition of newly public firms to the rigors of 
public trading.  Towards this end, I apply the logic of the resource based view (Barney, 
1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) to different sources of top management human and social 
capital in order to identify some which fit the relevance criterion of managerial prestige 
in the post-IPO context.  Specifically, I argue that prestigious educational credentials, 
managerial experiences in prestigious firms, and external directorates in prestigious 
firms represent1 valuable, rare, and inimitable sources of executive human and social 
capital in the post-IPO context, and as such are highly relevant to the post-IPO context. 
A Resource Based Perspective 
The long-term performance of IPO firms, in part, depends on their ability to cope 
with the rigors and challenges of public trading (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  As such, the 
post-IPO context often represents a highly complex decision-making environment for 
top executives.  Such complexity is likely to highlight the importance of top executives 
who have experiences relevant to the challenges faced by newly public firms.  A central 
thesis of this study is that executives who possess elite educational credentials, 
managerial experiences in prestigious firms, and/or external directorate experiences in 
prestigious firms are better able to effectively manage the complexity of the post-IPO 
                                                 
1 Although managerial prestige is a multi-dimensional construct which may encompass a 
variety of top executive characteristics, this study focuses on executive characteristics that are 
specifically relevant to the IPO context.  As will be discussed in more detail, multiple theoretical 
perspectives suggest that prestigious educational credentials, managerial experiences in 
prestigious firms, and external director experiences in prestigious firms are highly salient to the 
issues faced by firms making the transition from private to public markets. 
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environment faced by newly public firms as they transition to public markets than those 
without such experiences.  In order to theoretically ground this argument I incorporate 
the logic of the resource based view and argue that executives who possess elite 
educational credentials, managerial experiences in prestigious firms, and external 
directorate experiences in prestigious firms represent valuable, rare and inimitable 
sources of human and social capital to newly public firms. 
The resource based view suggests that resources which are valuable, rare, and 
inimitable represent potential sources of competitive advantage to the firms that control 
them (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984).  Thus, in order to ascertain the 
benefits and relevance of executive experiences one must address questions regarding 
their value, rarity and inimitability.  The answers to these questions are likely to be 
highly context dependent (Priem & Butler, 2001).  Consequently, it is important to 
address these questions in light of the context in which executive experiences are to be 
utilized. 
The IPO represents the context of this study.  This context is unique for several 
reasons, many of which were discussed in Chapter III.  Accordingly, I address the 
questions of the rarity, inimitability and value of executive prestigious firm managerial 
experiences, prestigious firm directorate experience, and elite educational credentials in 
light of this context. 
Although the possession of prestigious firm managerial experience, prestigious 
firm external directorate experience and prestigious educational credentials may be 
typical of executives in large, well established, publicly trade firms, there are several 
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reasons to suggest that they may represent both rare and inimitable resources among 
newly public firms.  First, executives of prestigious companies, executives with external 
directorate experience in prestigious firms, and executives with elite educational 
credentials represent members of elite managerial circles (Useem, 1979, 1984; Useem & 
Karabel, 1986).  As such, the initial pool from which IPO firms can draw such 
executives is limited.  Second, IPO firms are typically considered risky ventures (Certo, 
2003), and as such executives who possess such experiences may shy away from them in 
order to protect their reputations from the stigma of being associated with a poorly 
performing firm (Blau, 1964; Cohen & Dean, 2005; Podolny, 1994).  This suggests that 
even when a sizable pool of executives with these types of experiences exists convincing 
such an executive to join an IPO firm may require substantial compensation, which may 
dissuade IPO firms from pursuing them.  Third, IPO firm executives who lack 
prestigious firm managerial experiences, prestigious firm external directorate experience 
and elite educational credentials may resist their replacement (Li & Cannella, 2003).  In 
summary, there are several reasons why these particular executive experiences may 
represent rare and inimitable resources in the post-IPO context. 
Having discussed the rarity and inimitability of managerial prestige, I now shift 
my focus to address value of these resources.  Prior research suggests that the value of 
executive resources is also contingent on the context in which they are employed 
(Carpenter et al., 2001).  In the sections that follow, I develop hypotheses that address 
the value of executives who possess prestigious firm managerial experiences, prestigious 
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firm external directorate experience and elite educational credentials in the IPO context 
and thus develop hypotheses regarding their influence on firm performance. 
Prestigious Educational Credentials 
Prior research suggests that the educational credentials of top executives play an 
important role in determining TMT effectiveness (Cooper et al., 1994; D’Aveni, 1990).  
Top executive prestigious educational credentials, defined as the rank of degree granting 
institution from which top executives receive their college degrees, may represent a 
valuable resource in the IPO context for three reasons.  First, the possession of 
prestigious educational credentials implies intellectual capability, and thus ability to deal 
with managerial complexity brought on by the IPO.  Extant research provides a rationale 
for linking the possession of prestigious educational credentials to intellectual capability.  
For example, the level of individual educational achievement has been found to be 
positively related to individual cognitive complexity (Hitt & Tyler, 1991; Wally & 
Baum, 1994). 
Second, elite educational credentials embody social ties to elite social networks 
(Domoff, 1970; Palmer & Barber, 2001).  Consistent with this view, extant research 
suggests that elite educational social ties provide information regarding innovative 
administrative and management practices.  For example Palmer et al. (1993) find that 
executive elite business school credentials are positively related to the rate of diffusion 
of the Multi-divisional form of organizational structure.  This suggests that elite 
educational ties may provide executives with information and resources that contribute 
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to firm ability to adapt to the requirements of the public arena by facilitating the 
formalization of reporting routines, and the standardization of organizational structures 
required by public stock markets. 
Third, a growing body of research suggests that the prestige of institutions from 
which top executives receive his/her educational credentials contribute to organizational 
legitimacy.  For example, D’Aveni (1990) posited that the prestige of educational 
credentials possessed by a firm’s top executive enhances firm legitimacy by indicating 
managerial competence, skill and trustworthiness.  Consistent with this logic, Lester et 
al. (2006) demonstrated that the prestige of educational credentials possessed by top 
executives contribute to IPO firm ability to garner financial resources from capital 
markets. 
In summary, this discussion suggests that the elite educational credentials 
possessed by top executives represent valuable sources of human and social capital for 
newly public firms.  Specifically, this discussion suggests that the possession of elite 
educational credentials by top executives may enhance their ability to deal with the 
complexity of, as well as adapt organizational structures and routines to the public arena.  
Additionally, this discussion suggests that that top executive elite educational credentials 
contribute to the legitimacy of IPO firms.  As such, such these executive characteristics 
are likely to represent valuable resources for newly public firms.  Consequently, I 
hypothesize the following:  Hypothesis 1:  Prestigious executive educational credentials 
at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO firm performance. 
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Prestigious Firm Managerial Experience 
Prior research suggests that the prior managerial work experiences of top 
executive shape their abilities and predispositions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Particularly salient in the context of newly public firms is 
managerial experience in prestigious firms.  Extant research suggests that top executive 
managerial experience in prestigious firms may be valuable to newly public firms for 
multiple reasons.  Theory and evidence on socio-cognitive processes suggest that 
through their personal experiences individuals develop ‘knowledge structures’ that allow 
more efficient information processing and accurate predictions (Ford & Baucus, 1987; 
Stabell, 1978; Walsh, 1995).  Prior research also suggests that managerial skills are 
primarily based on tacit forms of knowledge (Cooper et al., 1994) which, by definition, 
are developed through personal experience.  This suggests that executives with prior 
managerial experience in prestigious firms may develop tacit knowledge required to 
implement the strategies and management techniques of their successful and well-
respected prior employers (Boeker, 1997; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001).  Thus, the 
possession of managerial experience in prestigious firms may represent a form of human 
capital that enables executives to cope with and adapt to the complexity of public 
trading. 
Second, the prior managerial experiences of senior executives serve to expand a 
focal firm’s social network by providing ties to prior employers and former colleagues 
(Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  Thus, ties to the prestigious prior employers of top 
managers may provide preferential access to the resources and information of the prior 
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employer (Burton et al., 2002).  Such ties may also serve to enhance the prestige with 
which a focal firm is viewed by other organizations (Podolny, 1993, 1994), thereby 
contributing to firm legitimacy. 
The prior discussion suggests that the possession of prior experience in 
prestigious firms represents a valuable source of executive human and social capital.  
This intangible resource is suggested to contribute to firm ability to cope with the 
complexity of, as well as enhance firm legitimacy as newly public firms adapt to the 
public arena.  Accordingly, I propose that top executive managerial experience in 
prestigious firms represents a firm resource beneficial to overcoming the deleterious 
effects of the IPO event.  Thus, I hypothesize the following:  Hypothesis 2:  Executive 
prior managerial experiences in prestigious firms at the time of a firm’s IPO are 
positively related to post-IPO firm performance. 
Prestigious Firm Core Executive Role Experience 
Prior research highlights the importance of executive role experience in the IPO 
context (Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Li & Cannella, 2003).  Role experience refers to 
matching of prior executive roles with to current roles (Higgins & Gulati, 2006).  Prior 
role experience in prestigious public firms may be beneficial for a couple of reasons.  
First, role experience in prestigious firms may allow executives to develop the 
managerial skills and tacit knowledge required to effectively fulfill the responsibilities of 
their positions.  Second, extant research suggests that executive prior role experience 
contributes to the legitimacy of IPO firms by conforming to the roles proscribed by their 
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position (Higgins & Gulati, 2006).  Consistent with the attention based view (Ocasio, 
1997), I suggest that the legitimacy effects of prior executive role experience may be 
especially salient when such experience takes place in a prestigious firm given it’s 
relevance to the challenges faced by newly public firms. 
Research suggests that the prior role experiences of ‘core’ members of the TMT 
are particularly salient in the IPO context (Higgins & Gulati, 2006).  Top management 
teams often have a “stable core” and a “dynamic periphery” (Boeker, 1992; Finkelstein, 
1992; Roberto, 2003).  According to Roberto (2003), a small group of the most senior 
executives work together on all strategic decisions, while a larger group of lower ranking 
executives contribute to strategic decision making on an issue by issue basis (Roberto, 
2003).  Given their position at the pinnacle of the upper echelons, core members of a 
firm’s management group are exposed to, and possess experience in dealing with a broad 
range of strategic, organizational, and operational issues (Roberto, 2003).  Accordingly, 
core members of a firm’s top management team invest a substantial amount of time in 
monitoring and controlling organizational processes and performance (Roberto, 2003). 
This suggests that core executive experience in prestigious firms may be of 
substantial value as a firm makes the organizational, structural, and performance 
objective changes required as a newly public firm transitions from the private to public 
arena.  Specifically, the possession of prior core executive experience in prestigious 
firms by a firm’s core executives may contribute to firm adaptation to public markets, as 
well firm legitimacy, both of which are likely to enhance post-IPO firm performance.  
As such I hypothesize the following:  Hypothesis 3:  Prior core executive role 
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experiences in prestigious firms at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-
IPO firm performance. 
Prestigious Firm External Directorships 
Lorsch and MacIver (1989:27) highlight the potential value of prestigious 
external directorships, citing one chief executive officer who stated, “Serving on a board 
is a way to see how somebody else is doing the same thing you’re doing.  I usually look 
at the company to see if they are a strong, growing firm.”  This suggests that as firm 
executives serve on the boards of other firms they gain insight into how things get done 
at other firms (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  Supportive of this view, a sizable body of 
research suggests that external directorships facilitate the diffusion of corporate practices 
(Rao et al., 2000; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999), strategies (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; 
Haunschild, 1993; Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001) and structures (Palmer et al., 1987). 
Davis et al. (2003:301) note, “the point-to-point contagion process among boards 
is straightforward:  boards meet frequently, and directors bring their knowledge and 
insights gained on one board to bear on the question faced by their other boards.”  In 
particular, serving as a director on the board of a prestigious firm provides executives the 
opportunity to observe and learn about the practices, structures, and strategies of highly 
respected and successful firms.  As such, service on the board of prestigious firms may 
provide tops executive with tacit knowledge of the practices, structures, and strategies 
that may facilitate a newly public firm’s transition to the public arena. 
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This discussion suggests that the prestigious external directorships of top 
management may increase executive ability to implement the required adaptation and 
reorientation processes required of newly public firm as they transition to the public 
arena.  Consequently, top executive prestigious external directorships may represent 
valuable sources of executive human and social capital which aid newly public firms in 
adapting to the rigors of public trading, as well as contribute to organizational 
legitimacy.  As a result I hypothesize the following:  Hypothesis 4:  Executive external 
directorships in prestigious firms at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to 
post-IPO firm performance. 
A Resource Dependence Perspective 
The transition from the private to public arena often results in substantial 
resource constraints for newly public firms (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  Extant research 
on transformational change suggests that the support of key external resource holders 
may shield a firm from the deleterious effects of the transformation process.  For 
example, Miner et al. (1990) find that links between a newspaper and influential political 
parties increase the newspaper’s ability to adapt to and survive transformational change.  
Specific to surviving the transformational change associated with the IPO event, Fischer 
and Pollock (2004) find the resources provided by embedded underwriters decrease the 
likelihood of firm failure. 
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Paradoxically, while newly public firms have substantial need for resources and 
support from key environmental constituencies, they likely face difficulty in procuring 
such support.  The reason for this difficulty is that newly public firms face a liability of 
market newness (Certo, 2003).  The liability of market newness stems from the 
uncertainty surrounding the viability of newly public firms given the fact that they often 
fail to adapt to the rigors of public markets (Certo, 2003).  As a result of the uncertainty 
surrounding IPO firms, external constituencies may withhold their support and 
resources. 
Consistent with resource dependency theory, I propose that managerial prestige 
enhances the performance of newly public firms by engendering the support of key 
environmental resource holders.  Top executives are situated at the boundary of the firm 
that employs them (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  As individuals who are highly visible to 
and often interact with external constituencies (Pfeffer, 1981, 1983), prestigious top 
managers and the social capital they embody, may play a key role in the acquisition of 
support and resources from key environmental constituencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
Identifying Key External Resource Holders 
While managerial prestige may influence a variety of potential external resource 
holders in the pursuit of firm growth and survival, this study focuses on external 
resource holders who address the challenges and liabilities associated with the post-IPO 
context.  Extant research suggests that newly public firms face numerous challenges in 
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adapting to the public arena, two of which are particularly salient to the current study 
(Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  First, the transition from the private to the public arena 
diverts resources and managerial attention from normal operating activities to 
reorientation and adaptation.  Second, newly public firms face challenges in coping with 
changes in goals resulting from potentially conflicting objectives and differing time 
horizons of new and often more numerous investors.  In the following sections I develop 
hypotheses which suggest that the support provided by dedicated institutional investors 
and prestigious alliance partners aid newly public firms in overcoming these two 
challenges associated with adapting to the public arena. 
Prestigious Alliance Partners 
Resource constraints limit the growth and survival of all organizations (Penrose, 
1959; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  In the context of post-IPO firm growth and survival, 
resource constraints stem from firm adaptation to the rigors and challenges of being 
publicly traded (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  Given the resource constraints faced by 
newly public firms, strategic actions that allow a firm to conserve and/or access 
additional resources are likely to enhance post-IPO firm growth and survival. 
Strategic alliances represent one type of strategic action that may allow a firm to 
both conserve its own resources and access the resources of others.  First, strategic 
alliances enable firms to share resources (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hamel et al., 1989; 
Ohmae, 1989; Stuart, 1998).  As Ireland et al. (2002:413) note, “strategic alliances are 
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cooperative arrangements between two or more firms to improve their competitive 
position and performance by sharing resources.” 
Second, strategic alliances may also increase a newly public firm’s survival and 
growth prospects by signaling firm legitimacy (Baum & Mezias, 1993; Stuart, 2000).  
The challenges and difficulties in transitioning from the private to public arena can 
create uncertainty in the mind of potential stakeholders regarding the viability of IPO 
firms (Certo, 2003).  This uncertainty may limit external stakeholder willingness to lend 
support to a newly public firm.  In order to address uncertainty surrounding firm 
viability, external stakeholders are likely to search for indicators of firm legitimacy such 
as those provided by strategic alliances (Stuart et al., 1999). 
Prior research generally suggests that strategic alliances increase firm growth 
prospects and survival chances.  For instance, Stuart et al. (1999) find that the number of 
alliances formed is positively related to sales growth in start-ups.  Sarkar et al. (2001) 
find that alliance proactiveness, defined as the extent to which an organization engages 
in identifying and responding to partnering opportunities, is positively related to market 
performance.  Additionally, Singh and Mitchell (2005) find that alliances at the time of 
market entry as well as post-entry alliances are positively related to sales growth.  
Increases in sales growth may contribute to firm survival prospects (Mitchell et al., 
1994).  Finally, Mitchell and Singh (1996) demonstrate that strategic alliances may 
contribute to firm survival. 
While research suggests strategic alliances often enhance firm growth and 
survival prospects (Singh & Mitchell, 2005), strategic alliances may require considerable 
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investments of managerial attention and resources (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 
2002).  Research on strategic alliances suggests that the characteristics of a firm’s 
alliance partners play an important role in determining the extent to which a firm 
actually benefits from a strategic alliance (Reuer, 1999).  I suggest that prestigious 
alliance partners may be particularly beneficial to newly public firms.  The formation of 
a strategic alliance with a prestigious firm may allow a newly public firm to observe and 
learn the practices, routines and organizational structures of its prestigious partner 
(Hamel et al., 1989).  Indeed, there are numerous theoretical (Inkpen, 2000; Kogut, 
1988; Larsson et al., 1998) and empirical studies (Hitt et al., 2000; Inkpen & Crossan, 
1995; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998) which link strategic alliances and 
organizational learning.  Consistent with this literature, I suggest that the exposure of 
newly public firm to the practices of prestigious strategic alliance partners provide it 
with an opportunity to internalize the organizational capabilities, structures and routines 
of their prestigious partners.  The internalization of these practices and routines, in turn, 
is likely to increase firm ability to implement the changes to organizational structures 
and practices required to transition to the public arena.  Additionally, such affiliations 
are likely to contribute to firm legitimacy.  This discussion suggests the following 
hypothesis:  Hypothesis 5:  The number of post-IPO strategic alliances formed with 
prestigious firms is positively associated with post-IPO firm performance. 
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Dedicated Institutional Investors 
The transition made by IPO firms often presents them with the new challenge of 
satisfying the conflicting demands of multiple new investors who differ in their 
investment time horizons and objectives from early investors (Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  
In particular, newly public firms must adapt to the pressures of greater investor demand 
for meeting short-term performance objectives and less investor tolerance for 
performance volatility (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Price Waterhouse, 1995).  The 
pressures of effectively meeting the demands of multiple investment constituencies are 
likely to be a key concern for top executives because failure to do so typically leads to a 
variety of negative outcomes for top executives (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). 
Paradoxically, top executive preoccupation with these pressures may diminish 
post-IPO firm growth and survival in at least two ways.  First, increased investor 
concern with short-term performance may reduce managerial willingness to invest in 
log-term projects and strategies that foster firm growth and survival.  For instance, prior 
empirical research suggests that the short-term (long-term) time preferences of 
institutional investors decreases (increases) firm investment in research and development 
activities, human resources, and international diversification (Baysinger et al., 1991; 
David et al., 2001; Tihanyi et al., 2003), each of which are essential to sustained firm 
performance.  Second, managerial concern regarding investor and analyst reactions to 
short-term performance volatility can divert managerial resources and attention away 
from firm strategic and operational initiatives (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999) to developing 
ways of satisfying firm investors (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003). 
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Dedicated institutional investors may represent key external resource holders that 
can reduce the pressures faced by top executives of newly public firms to satisfy the 
various constituencies to which they are beholden.  Dedicated institutional investors are 
institutional investors who own, “large, long-term holdings, which are concentrated in 
only a few firms” (Bushee, 1998:310).  As a result of the nature of their holdings, 
dedicated institutional investors have substantial incentive to monitor managers and, 
more importantly, to focus on measures of firm performance other than short-term 
earnings in assessing managerial performance (Bushee, 1998; Porter, 1992a, b).  
Additionally, dedicated institutional investors provide firms with a stable base of 
investors who have long-term investment objectives, resulting in less stock churning 
(Bushee, 1998) and lower stock price volatility (Carter & Dark, 1993; Ellis et al., 2000). 
This discussion suggests that the extent to which a firm’s stock is owned by 
dedicated institutional investors may diminish the amount of short-term earnings 
pressure faced by managers of newly public companies.  Consequently, this lack of 
pressure on short-term earnings may aid top executives of newly public firms in focusing 
their attention on other more long-term strategic and operational issues that foster firm 
growth and survival.  As such I hypothesize the following:  Hypothesis 6:  The amount 
of dedicated institutional investment in a newly public firm is positively associated with 
post-IPO firm performance. 
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Garnering the Support of Key External Resource Holders 
Having identified prestigious strategic alliance partners and dedicated 
institutional investors as key external resource holders in the IPO context, I know shift 
my focus to addressing the role of managerial prestige in garnering their support.  
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), as well as multiple empirical 
studies (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Higgins & Gulati, 
2003, 2006; Lester et al., 2006) suggest that executives, as important sources of firm 
level social capital, play a critical role in garnering the support of key external resource 
holders.  Consequently I posit that the prestige of top executives play a central role in 
creating opportunities for IPO firms to garner the support of key external resource 
holders. 
The attention based view suggests that the actions of decision makers, such as 
those of key external resource holders, are dependent on the issues they focus on 
(Ocasio, 1997).  The attention based view also suggests that the issues decision makers 
focus on depends on the context they face (Ocasio, 1997).  This is consistent with prior 
research which suggests a central concern of external resource holders when deciding 
whether to support newly public firms is that of whether an IPO firm will be able to 
adapt to the public market (Certo, 2003).  This concern, termed the liability of market 
newness (Certo, 2003), represents a primary deterrent to newly public firms garnering 
the support of key external resource holders.  This suggests that factors which address 
the ability of newly public firm to adapt to the rigors of public trading are likely to 
reduce the effects of the liability of market newness, suffered by newly public firms, 
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thereby providing them with greater opportunity to garner the support of key external 
resource holders. 
I draw upon prior research to suggest three primary reasons why managerial 
prestige may represent one of such factors.  First, the prestige of top executives 
contributes to organizational legitimacy by signaling managerial competency and firm 
quality (D’Aveni, 1990; Lester et al., 2006).  As indicators of managerial ability to cope 
with the complexity of being publicly traded, executive educational prestige, prior 
managerial experiences, and external directorships speak directly address the liability of 
market newness.  Second, the social ties embodied in managerial prestige foster 
awareness of opportunities for entering transactions (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Finally, the social ties embodied in managerial prestige engender trust between 
transacting parties (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996). 
Prior research also suggests that firm characteristics at the time of the IPO may 
make a lasting impression on external resource holder perceptions of firm legitimacy.  
For example, prior research examining decision making demonstrates that individual 
evaluations tend to be biased toward an initial anchor (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971).  In 
support of this view Pollock et al. (2002) find that IPO under pricing, venture capital 
backing at the time of the IPO, and underwriter reputation are positively related to 
resource acquisition subsequent to the IPO. 
Taken together these points suggest that managerial prestige at the time of a 
firm’s IPO is likely to be highly relevant to garnering the support of key external 
resource holders in the post-IPO context.  This leads me to hypothesize the following:  
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Hypothesis 7:  Executive managerial prestige at the time of the IPO is positively related 
to the number of post-IPO strategic alliances formed with prestigious alliance partners.   
Hypothesis 8:  Executive managerial prestige at the time of the IPO is positively related 
to the amount of dedicated institutional investment in a newly public firm. 
The Partially-Mediated Effects of Managerial Prestige 
Having discussed the performance effects of prestigious alliance partners and 
dedicated institutional investors on post-IPO firm performance, as well as how 
managerial prestige may engender their support, I now shift my focus to detailing how 
they may mediate the relationship between executive managerial prestige and post-IPO 
firm performance.  Previously I hypothesized that managerial prestige diminishes the 
liability of market newness, increasing the willingness of key external resource holders 
such as prospective dedicated institutional investment and prestigious alliance partners 
to enter into exchange relationships with newly public firms.  I also previously argued 
that the support and resources provided by dedicated institutional investment and 
prestigious alliance partners serve to buffer newly public firms from the harmful effects 
of transitioning from private to public markets, thus increasing post-IPO firm 
performance.  Specifically, I have proposed that the support provided by prestigious 
alliance partners and dedicated institutional investment diminish the resource constraints 
associated with adaptation and reorientation to the public arena.   
The preceding arguments suggest that managerial prestige may increase post-IPO 
firm performance through the acquisition of resources and support provided by 
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prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional investment.  However, I 
anticipate only partial mediation of the effects of managerial prestige on post-IPO firm 
performance by publicly traded strategic alliance partners and dedicated institutional 
investment.  The rationale for this is that, as hypothesized earlier, the characteristics 
embodied by managerial prestige represent valuable sources of human and social capital 
in the IPO context, in and of themselves.  As a result, I suggest they are likely to 
continue to influence firm performance directly even when controlling for the effects of 
publicly traded alliance partners and dedicated institutional investment.  Thus, I 
hypothesize the following:  Hypotheses 9:  The positive relationship between managerial 
prestige at the time of a firm’s IPO and post-IPO firm performance is partially mediated 
by the number of post-IPO strategic alliances that a newly public firm forms with 
prestigious firms.  Hypotheses 10:  The positive relationship between managerial 
prestige at the time of a firm’s IPO and post-IPO firm performance is partially mediated 
by the amount of dedicated institutional investment in a newly public firm. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe how the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter III are empirically tested.  This chapter consists of five sections.  The first 
section presents a discussion of the sample.  The second, third, fourth and fifth sections 
describe the nature of the dependent, independent, mediators, and control variables 
respectively used in this study.  This chapter concludes with a description of the 
statistical models utilized in testing the hypotheses developed in Chapter III. 
Sample 
The theory and hypotheses in this study were tested on a sample of firms 
undergoing the IPO process during the calendar year of 1997.  This sample was selected 
for several reasons.  First, the theoretical arguments developed in this dissertation focus 
on the challenges faced by newly public firms.  Second, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) website, EDGAR, has complete electronic copies of all firm SEC 
filings for the calendar year 1997, whereas it contains only partial firm filings in the 
prior year.  Third, selecting IPO firms from 1997 allowed each IPO firm to be tracked 
for up to 5 years following its IPO to develop measures of post-IPO firm growth and 
survival.  Finally, 1997 was a very active year in terms of IPOs (Ritter & Welch, 2002). 
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The base sample for this study was drawn from two primary sources.  First, the 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Global New Issues database provides information on 
(484 IPOs).  Second, Jay Ritter has compiled an annual list of IPO firms, along with 
their founding year (436 IPOs).  Utilizing these two data sources I was able to link 391 
IPOs, by firm name, to create the initial sample for this study.  Based upon this initial 
sample, IPO prospectuses were identified from EDGAR resulting in a final sample of 
379 firms. 
Each of the 379 sample firms listed in Table 1 were subjected to the following 
criteria for inclusion in the final sample.  First, each firm must have issued stock to 
public markets (i.e., NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX) for the first time.  Second, each 
firm must have been headquartered in the United States at the time of the IPO.  Meeting 
this criterion controls for potential cultural differences that are beyond the scope of this 
study.  Third, in line with prior research on IPOs (Ritter, 1991), each firm must not have 
been classified as any of the following:  corporate spin-offs, unit issues, mutual to stock 
conversions, real estate investment trusts or leveraged buy outs.
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TABLE 1 
Sample Firm Identifiers and IPO Date 
PERMNO IPO Date Company Name 
84385 1/28/1997 Administaff Inc 
84391 1/30/1997 HomeSide Inc 
84394 1/23/1997 RDO Equipment Co 
84396 1/30/1997 Trigon Healthcare Inc 
84412 1/22/1997 CD Warehouse Inc 
84413 1/30/1997 Cerus Corp 
84414 1/28/1997 Coulter Pharmaceuticals Inc 
84416 1/28/1997 Coldwater Creek Inc 
84418 1/21/1997 EarthLink Network Inc 
84420 1/30/1997 EPIX Medical Inc 
84421 2/3/1997 ErgoBilt Inc 
84422 1/17/1997 Eco Soil Systems Inc 
84426 1/29/1997 Medialink Worldwide Inc 
84427 1/28/1997 Medirisk Inc 
84428 1/29/1997 Metro Information Services Inc 
84429 1/30/1997 Medical Manager Corp 
84430 1/29/1997 National Auto Finance Company 
84434 1/29/1997 Photoelectron Corp 
84436 1/22/1997 SEEC Inc 
84438 1/9/1997 Sun Hydraulics Corp 
84440 1/29/1997 Template Software Inc 
84509 2/13/1997 Advanced Electronic Support 
84510 2/19/1997 Apex PC Solutions Inc 
84511 2/4/1997 Aastrom Biosciences Inc 
84513 2/12/1997 Birman Managed Care Inc 
84514 2/12/1997 Biosite Diagnostics 
84517 2/10/1997 Coast Dental Services Inc 
84519 2/7/1997 CIENA Corp 
84523 2/12/1997 Daou Systems Inc 
84525 2/5/1997 Digital Lightwave Inc 
84526 2/25/1997 Deltek Systems Inc 
84530 2/25/1997 Edge Petroleum Corp 
84531 2/3/1997 Electronic Processing Inc 
84534 2/27/1997 First Aviation Services Inc 
84535 2/7/1997 Four Media Co 
84536 2/7/1997 General Bearing Corp 
84537 2/13/1997 Gentle Dental Service Corp 
84543 2/20/1997 ILEX Oncology Inc 
84545 2/14/1997 Judge Group Inc 
84549 2/18/1997 Micro Therapeutics Inc 
84550 2/28/1997 Mercury Waste Solutions Inc 
84555 2/21/1997 Overland Data Inc 
84556 2/5/1997 Preferred Employers Holdings 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
PERMNO IPO Date Company Name 
84559 2/3/1997 Premier Research Worldwide Inc 
84560 2/12/1997 Qualix Group Inc 
84561 2/12/1997 Radiant Systems Inc 
84562 2/6/1997 Specialty Care Network Inc 
84563 2/13/1997 Silgan Holdings Inc 
84564 2/25/1997 Special Metals Corp 
84565 2/18/1997 VDI Media 
84568 2/27/1997 Vistana Inc 
84569 2/12/1997 Wesley Jessen (Bain Capital) 
84570 2/5/1997 Yurie Systems Inc 
84573 2/20/1997 Brylane Inc 
84578 2/11/1997 Community Capital Corp, SC 
84580 2/28/1997 General Cigar Holdings Inc 
84583 2/7/1997 Puro Water Group Inc 
84587 2/21/1997 US Rentals Inc 
84588 2/3/1997 Vail Resorts Inc 
84589 2/5/1997 Brunswick Technologies Inc 
84594 ¾/1997 Aviation Distributors Inc 
84595 3/27/1997 AHL Services Inc 
84597 3/3/1997 Ameritrade Holding Corp 
84599 3/5/1997 Complete Business Solutions 
84600 3/17/1997 Colonial Downs Holdings Inc 
84604 3/21/1997 Cell Therapeutics Inc 
84605 3/19/1997 Endocardial Solutions Inc 
84606 3/6/1997 Euronet Services Inc 
84607 3/6/1997 EMCORE Corp 
84609 3/20/1997 Physicians Specialty Corp 
84612 3/19/1997 Fieldworks Inc 
84624 3/12/1997 Macrovision Corp 
84625 3/13/1997 NeoMagic Corp 
84626 3/20/1997 Omniquip International Inc 
84627 3/20/1997 PalEx Inc 
84628 3/12/1997 ProMedCo Management Co 
84631 3/11/1997 Storage Dimensions Inc 
84632 3/11/1997 Total Control Products Inc 
84645 3/10/1997 Pluma Inc 
84649 ¾/1997 Riviera Tool Co 
84662 4/17/1997 Essex International 
84663 4/24/1997 Hertz Corp 
84718 4/11/1997 AccelGraphics Inc 
84720 4/15/1997 ASI Solutions Inc 
84721 4/10/1997 BEA Systems Inc 
84722 4/25/1997 Bionx Implants Inc 
84728 4/16/1997 DeCrane Aircraft Holdings Inc 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
PERMNO IPO Date Company Name 
84737 4/3/1997 Gulf Island Fabrication Inc 
84741 4/29/1997 International CompuTex Inc 
84746 4/9/1997 Meade Instruments Corp 
84752 4/3/1997 Objective Communication Inc 
84753 4/17/1997 ONSALE Inc 
84755 4/8/1997 Peregrine Systems Inc 
84763 4/10/1997 Valley National Gases Inc 
84768 5/30/1997 American Retirement Corp 
84776 5/15/1997 General Cable Corp 
84778 5/21/1997 Hartford Life (ITT Hartford) 
84779 5/7/1997 Journal Register Co 
84780 5/9/1997 Knoll Inc (Warburg, Pincus) 
84785 4/30/1997 Weider Nutrition International 
84788 5/15/1997 Amazon.com Inc 
84789 5/29/1997 Ascent Pediatrics Inc 
84790 5/13/1997 ASD Group Inc 
84792 5/8/1997 Brigham Exploration Co 
84793 5/1/1997 Brookdale Living Communities 
84796 5/27/1997 Carey International Inc 
84801 5/28/1997 DSI Toys Inc 
84802 5/2/1997 DTM Corp 
84805 5/15/1997 First Sierra Financial Inc 
84811 5/21/1997 Healthcare Recoveries Inc 
84815 5/6/1997 Kaynar Technologies Inc 
84816 5/19/1997 Lexington Healthcare Group 
84818 5/2/1997 Marine Management Systems Inc 
84823 5/29/1997 NetSpeak Corp 
84827 5/13/1997 Rambus Inc 
84997 6/19/1997 Aurora Biosciences Corp 
84998 6/24/1997 Acorn Products Inc 
84999 6/27/1997 Advanced Communication Systems 
85001 6/18/1997 Aris Corp 
85005 6/5/1997 Cardima Inc 
85010 6/17/1997 Genesys Telecommun Labs 
85011 6/19/1997 Great Plains Software Inc 
85012 6/10/1997 HTE Inc 
85013 6/17/1997 inTEST Corp 
85015 6/12/1997 IWL Communications Inc 
85016 6/26/1997 800-JR Cigar Inc 
85018 6/10/1997 JetFax Inc 
85021 6/19/1997 Laser Power Corp 
85023 6/4/1997 Melita International Corp 
85025 6/25/1997 New Century Financial Corp 
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TABLE 1 
Continued 
PERMNO IPO Date Company Name 
85026 6/18/1997 New Era of Networks Inc 
85028 6/17/1997 ORBIT/FR 
85030 6/10/1997 Peapod Inc 
85031 6/5/1997 PSW Technologies Inc 
85032 6/23/1997 Qwest Communications Corp 
85034 6/11/1997 Racing Champions Corp 
85035 6/3/1997 RF Micro Devices Inc 
85036 6/26/1997 Robocom Systems Inc 
85038 6/19/1997 RWD Tech Inc 
85040 6/18/1997 Simulations Plus Inc 
85042 6/25/1997 Staff Leasing Inc 
85043 6/12/1997 Star Telecommunications Inc 
85044 6/24/1997 Saxton Inc 
85045 6/17/1997 SysComm International Corp 
85046 6/25/1997 3Dfx Interactive Inc 
85048 6/19/1997 Professional Transportation 
85051 6/13/1997 Waste Industries Inc 
85055 6/18/1997 ARM Financial Group Inc 
85059 6/27/1997 Comfort Systems USA Inc 
85063 6/23/1997 Domain Energy Corporation 
85065 6/26/1997 JLK Direct Distribution Inc 
85067 6/12/1997 Maximus Inc 
85071 6/4/1997 Pameco Corp 
85072 6/11/1997 Polo Ralph Lauren Corp 
85075 6/5/1997 Silverleaf Resorts Inc 
85077 6/18/1997 StarTek Inc 
85078 6/24/1997 Waterlink Inc 
85157 7/10/1997 Apollo International of 
85158 7/7/1997 Allstar Systems Inc 
85160 7/11/1997 At Home Corp 
85162 7/8/1997 Axiom Inc 
85165 7/28/1997 BioReliance Corp 
85166 7/29/1997 Corsair Communications Inc 
85168 7/1/1997 Cal Dive International Inc 
85171 7/24/1997 CMP Media LLC 
85173 7/2/1997 Coinstar Inc 
85174 7/2/1997 Centennial HealthCare Corp 
85177 7/2/1997 8x8 Inc 
85180 7/21/1997 Friede Goldman International 
85184 7/3/1997 Hagler Bailly Inc 
85187 6/30/1997 Heska Corp 
85188 7/30/1997 Information Management Assocs 
85190 7/23/1997 JLM Industries Inc 
85193 7/17/1997 Monarch Dental Corp 
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PERMNO IPO Date Company Name 
85196 7/28/1997 Net.B@nk Inc 
85198 7/17/1997 Bank of the Ozarks, AK 
85203 7/2/1997 Peritus Software Services Inc 
85208 7/1/1997 Schick Technologies Inc 
85210 6/30/1997 Schuff Steel Co 
85212 7/1/1997 SpectRx Inc 
85213 7/24/1997 Scheid Vineyards Inc 
85214 7/17/1997 Total Entertainment Restaurant 
85215 7/9/1997 Telegroup Inc 
85216 7/23/1997 Trailer Bridge Inc 
85217 7/22/1997 Travel Services International 
85218 7/1/1997 TSI International Software Ltd 
85219 7/2/1997 Transcend Therapeutics Inc 
85223 7/30/1997 Visual Data Corp 
85224 7/30/1997 Vestcom International Inc 
85225 7/2/1997 Vista Medical Technologies Inc 
85227 7/8/1997 World of Science Inc 
85239 7/24/1997 Galileo International Inc 
85240 6/30/1997 Hanover Compressor Co 
85242 7/8/1997 Horizon Pharmacies Inc 
85245 7/10/1997 InfoCure Corp 
85246 7/16/1997 LaSalle Partners Inc 
85247 7/10/1997 Metals USA Inc 
85249 6/30/1997 Pierce Leahy Corp 
85258 8/18/1997 Clearview Cinema Group Inc 
85268 8/19/1997 US Liquids Inc 
85272 8/14/1997 Aehr Test Systems Inc 
85273 8/27/1997 Authentic Specialty Foods Inc 
85276 8/12/1997 CorporateFamily Solutions Inc 
85277 8/1/1997 Concentric Network Corp 
85278 7/31/1997 Continental Natural Gas Inc 
85280 8/6/1997 Carrizo Oil & Gas Inc 
85281 8/20/1997 CTB International Corp 
85284 8/14/1997 Discas Inc 
85288 8/27/1997 ExecuStay Corp 
85289 8/18/1997 Vision Twenty-One Inc 
85290 8/11/1997 fine.com International Corp 
85291 8/7/1997 GlobeComm Systems Inc 
85292 8/4/1997 Hall Kinion & Associates Inc 
85293 8/7/1997 Hyseq Inc 
85296 8/14/1997 International Isotopes Inc 
85298 8/22/1997 Kendle International Inc 
85300 8/15/1997 LeukoSite Inc 
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85302 8/22/1997 INSpire Insurance Solutions 
85304 8/4/1997 Ocular Sciences Inc 
85306 8/8/1997 Omtool Ltd 
85307 8/13/1997 On Stage Entertainment 
85310 8/21/1997 Premium Cigars International 
85311 8/6/1997 Pegasus Systems Inc 
85314 8/6/1997 QAD Inc 
85315 8/11/1997 Computer Motion Inc 
85318 8/13/1997 Sterigenics International Inc 
85319 8/12/1997 Syntel Inc 
85320 8/8/1997 A Consulting Team Inc 
85331 9/23/1997 Avis Rent A Car Inc 
85333 9/16/1997 Box Hill Systems Corp 
85336 9/23/1997 Industrial Distribution Group 
85343 9/17/1997 Security Capital Group Inc 
85351 9/5/1997 AutoCyte Inc 
85353 9/25/1997 Advantage Learning System Inc 
85356 9/25/1997 Big Dog Holdings Inc 
85357 9/24/1997 BridgeStreet Accommodations 
85360 9/30/1997 Best Software Inc 
85361 9/23/1997 Boron LePore & Associates Inc 
85363 9/12/1997 Castle Dental Centers Inc 
85365 9/18/1997 Coyote Sports Inc 
85366 9/3/1997 Compass Plastics 
85371 9/23/1997 EduTrek International Inc 
85372 9/17/1997 FARO Technologies Inc 
85373 9/22/1997 First International Bancorp 
85378 9/18/1997 Il Fornaio America Corp 
85379 9/19/1997 International Total Services 
85380 9/23/1997 JD Edwards & Co 
85382 9/15/1997 MegaBios Corp 
85388 9/26/1997 NextLink Communications Inc 
85390 9/18/1997 Children’s Place Retail Stores 
85393 9/19/1997 ProBusiness Services Inc 
85395 9/25/1997 Pervasive Software Inc 
85400 9/11/1997 Signature Eyewear Inc 
85402 9/24/1997 Star Buffet Inc 
85405 9/18/1997 UNIFAB International Inc 
85408 7/30/1997 American Champion 
85411 10/8/1997 American Italian Pasta Co 
85415 10/22/1997 Audio Book Club Inc 
85419 10/30/1997 Capital Senior Living Corp 
85424 10/22/1997 Dril-Quip Inc 
85427 10/29/1997 Group 1 Automotive Inc 
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85429 9/30/1997 Ivex Packaging Corp(Acadia) 
85432 10/16/1997 Mac-Gray Corp 
85436 10/1/1997 Petersen Companies Inc 
85437 10/1/1997 Securacom Inc 
85440 10/10/1997 Stoneridge Inc 
85452 10/9/1997 A C Moore Arts & Crafts Inc 
85454 10/30/1997 AVTEAM Inc 
85456 10/28/1997 Beringer Wine Estates Holdings 
85458 10/15/1997 Concord Communications Inc 
85459 10/15/1997 CH Robinson Worldwide Inc 
85463 10/1/1997 Corixa Corp 
85464 10/28/1997 Casella Waste Systems Inc 
85466 10/30/1997 Faroudja Inc 
85473 10/23/1997 ITC Deltacom Inc 
85474 10/22/1997 Innovative Valve Technologies 
85475 10/7/1997 Jevic Transportation Inc 
85476 10/10/1997 Kofax Image Products Inc 
85478 10/16/1997 Vari Lite International Inc 
85479 10/28/1997 Metromedia Fiber Network Inc 
85481 10/28/1997 MMC Networks Inc 
85482 10/10/1997 National Research Corp 
85483 10/17/1997 N2K Inc 
85484 10/20/1997 Neutral Posture Ergonomics Inc 
85486 9/30/1997 Omega Research Inc 
85488 10/1/1997 OSI Systems Inc 
85489 10/24/1997 OutSource International Inc 
85492 10/23/1997 Paula Financial Co 
85493 10/20/1997 Petroglyph Energy Inc 
85496 10/31/1997 Pericom Semiconductor Corp 
85499 10/8/1997 Renex Corp 
85500 10/21/1997 Rock of Ages Corp 
85502 10/6/1997 SCM Microsystems Inc 
85504 10/1/1997 SPR Inc 
85505 10/9/1997 Startec Global Communications 
85507 10/30/1997 TransCoastal Marine Services 
85508 10/10/1997 Track ‘n Trail Inc 
85509 10/20/1997 Toymax International Inc 
85511 10/7/1997 Trimeris Inc 
85512 10/28/1997 Tropical Sportswear Intl Corp 
85513 10/30/1997 UBICS Inc 
85514 10/22/1997 White Cap Industries Inc 
85515 10/29/1997 Zymetx Inc 
85518 10/22/1997 AmeriPath Inc 
85521 11/21/1997 Applied Films Corp 
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85522 11/25/1997 Applied Micro Circuits Corp 
85524 11/20/1997 American Physician Partners 
85526 11/24/1997 Bioanalytical Systems Inc 
85528 11/5/1997 Bay Bancshares, Laporte, Texas 
85531 11/7/1997 Bright Horizons Holdings Inc 
85536 11/24/1997 Motor Cargo Industries 
85538 11/20/1997 CrossZ Software Corp 
85539 11/14/1997 C3 Inc 
85541 11/4/1997 Dental Care Alliance Inc 
85542 11/20/1997 Denali Inc 
85544 11/24/1997 Electric Lightwave Inc 
85546 11/18/1997 Franchise Mortgage Acceptance 
85548 11/14/1997 Friendly Ice Cream Corp 
85549 11/21/1997 Gene Logic Inc 
85550 11/25/1997 GameTech International Inc 
85553 11/24/1997 Holt’s Cigar Holding Inc 
85555 11/21/1997 HealthWorld Corp 
85556 11/12/1997 Hybrid Networks Inc 
85557 11/5/1997 International Aircraft 
85560 11/19/1997 InterVU Inc 
85561 11/17/1997 Landmark Systems Corp 
85562 11/5/1997 LINC Group Inc 
85564 11/26/1997 Medical Science Systems Inc 
85565 11/26/1997 Nanophase Technologies Corp 
85568 11/6/1997 Precision Auto Care Inc 
85571 11/19/1997 Progenics Pharmaceuticals Inc 
85573 11/20/1997 PRT Group Inc 
85574 11/19/1997 Preview Travel Inc 
85575 11/24/1997 Paper Warehouse Inc 
85576 11/21/1997 RealNetworks Inc 
85578 11/6/1997 Somnus Medical Technologies 
85579 11/13/1997 SportsLine USA Inc 
85581 11/21/1997 Teligent Inc 
85584 11/4/1997 T&W Financial Corp 
85588 11/4/1997 Excel Switching Corp 
85590 11/4/1997 Young Innovations Inc 
85596 11/6/1997 American Skiing Co 
85597 11/3/1997 AMF Bowling Inc 
85598 11/4/1997 Bayard Drilling Technologies 
85603 11/20/1997 Dan River Inc 
85606 11/6/1997 Group Maintenance America 
85609 11/21/1997 HomeUSA Inc 
85610 11/25/1997 Howmet International Inc 
85611 11/14/1997 Hypercom Corp 
 63 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Continued 
PERMNO IPO Date Company Name 
85612 11/13/1997 IRI International Corp 
85613 11/18/1997 International Home Foods Inc 
85618 11/25/1997 Meadowcraft Inc 
85622 11/18/1997 Noble International Ltd 
85625 11/20/1997 Rayovac Corp 
85627 11/10/1997 Sonic Automotive Inc 
85629 11/24/1997 Trammell Crow Co 
85633 12/3/1997 Apex Mortgage Capital Inc 
85641 12/19/1997 Big City Radio Inc 
85646 12/17/1997 Delco Remy International Inc 
85653 12/23/1997 Friedman Billings Ramsey Group 
85655 12/18/1997 Lecg Inc 
85663 12/18/1997 United Rentals Inc 
85670 10/9/1997 USA Floral Products Inc 
85689 12/12/1997 FlexiInternational Software 
85690 12/11/1997 Focal Inc 
85696 12/3/1997 ImageMAX Inc 
85697 12/17/1997 IC Isaacs & Company Inc 
85700 12/4/1997 Midway Airlines Corp 
85702 12/2/1997 MPW Industrial Services Group 
85704 12/18/1997 Made2Manage Systems Inc 
85707 12/4/1997 OMNI Energy Services Corp 
85709 12/19/1997 PacificHealth Laboratories Inc 
85710 12/12/1997 Power Integrations Inc 
85713 12/16/1997 Princeton Video Image Inc 
85716 12/17/1997 Tier Technologies Inc 
85718 12/1/1997 US Vision Inc 
85719 12/5/1997 USWeb Corp 
85722 4/23/1997 Go2Net Inc 
86210 12/8/1997 Broughton Foods Co 
 
Dependent Variables 
Firm Failure 
Data on firm failure was gathered from the Center for Research on Securities 
Pricing (CRSP) data base.  CRSP records a delisting code for firms who de-list from a 
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stock exchange.  Because firms may de-list from a stock exchange for a variety of 
reasons (merger, acquisition, etc.) that do not correspond to firm failure, prior research 
has utilized delisting codes ranging from 500 to 585.  These codes indicate a firm’s 
inability to meet the requirements for listing on an exchange as a measure of firm failure 
(Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  Based upon this same range of CRSP delisting codes I coded 
firm survival (0) or firm failure (1) for each of the five years following a firm’s IPO.  As 
was appropriate for my analytic technique, and consistent with prior studies examining 
IPO firm failure (Fischer & Pollock, 2004), a firm was dropped from the sample after 
delisting, and the remaining firms were right-censored. 
Firm Growth 
Post-IPO firm growth was based on firm revenue data obtained from Compustat.  
Specifically, the natural logarithm of one plus firm revenues for 1996 and each of the 
five years following a firm’s IPO (1997-2001) was used to compose a firm growth 
trajectory.  Firm growth trajectories were calculated by utilizing random coefficients 
modeling (RCM) (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Singer, 1998). 
Independent Variables 
Managerial Prestige 
Data on each of the aspects of managerial prestige was collected from firm IPO 
prospectuses.  Consistent with prior operationalizations of top management groups, 
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biographical information was collected for each executive  officer listed in their 
respective firm’s IPO prospectus (Higgins & Gulati, 2006; Lester et al., 2006). 
Undergraduate Prestige.  A measure of educational prestige was created using the 
following procedures.  First, the educational background of each executive officer listed 
in the IPO prospectus was coded, noting whether an executive received a college degree 
(undergraduate) as well as the name of the college attended.  Second, each college an 
executive graduated from was assigned a value based upon the inverse of its U.S. News 
and World Report’s America’s Best Colleges for 1996.  Executives who graduated from 
educational institutions not counted among the 202 schools ranked by U.S. News and 
World Report were coded 0.  Next, I created a variable that represent executive 
undergraduate prestige.  I did this by calculating 1+ the natural log of the summed 
inverse college rankings of the colleges attended by a given firm’s executives for their 
undergraduate degree.2 
Prestigious Firm Managerial Experience.  I developed a measure of prestigious 
managerial experience utilizing the following steps.  First, I coded executives that had 
previously held the title of vice-president or higher3 in another firm as possessing ‘prior 
                                                 
2 I created similar measures for executive graduate education, but excluded them from 
the analysis because their high correlation (as high as .92) with the undergraduate measures 
created multi-collinearity issues.  Analyses including graduate educational prestige measures and 
excluding undergraduate prestige provided results that were similar, but statistically less 
significant than those of undergraduate prestige. 
3 Commonly coded titles included CEO, CFO, COO, Ex. Vp., Sr. Vp., Controller, 
Treasurer, Managing Director, and VP. 
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managerial experience.’  Second, for those executives deemed to have had prior 
managerial experiences, I noted the names of their former employers.  Third, I 
determined whether these managerial experiences took place in a firm that was publicly 
traded at the end of 1997.  I identified these publicly traded firms by name using a list 
(1977-1997) of firm names from the CRSP data base.  Finally, I created a measure of 
firm level executive public firm managerial experience by summing the number of 
publicly traded firms for which an IPO firm’s executives had previously worked for in a 
managerial capacity.  In order to address skewness the final measure of prestigious 
managerial experience was logged. 
Prestigious Firm External Directorates.  I coded an IPO firm executive as 
possessing prestigious public firm external directorates in a manner similar to that 
described for prestigious public firm managerial experience.  First, I coded executives 
that had previously served as an outside director in another firm as possessing external 
directorate experience.  Second, for those executives deemed to have external directorate 
experience I noted the name of the firm whose board they served.  Third, I determined 
whether these directorate experiences took place in firms that were publicly traded.  I 
identified publicly traded firms by name using the CRSP data base.  Finally, I created a 
measure of firm level executive public firm external directorate experience (prestigious 
external directorates) by summing the number of publicly traded firms for which an IPO 
firm’s executives had served as an outside director. 
Prestigious Firm Core Executive Role Experience.  I developed a measure of 
prestigious firm core executive role experience (prestigious core role experience) by 
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following the procedures outlined below.  Consistent with prior research I defined core 
executive positions as those with “C-level” titles (Higgins & Gulati, 2006).  C-level titles 
embody those that begin with “Chief”, namely the Chief Executive Officer, Chief 
Financial Officer, and Chief Operations Officer.  Next, I determined in how many 
instances the core executives (CEO, CFO, COO) of my sample IPO firms had previously 
held their same positions in a publicly trade firm and assigned each of these experiences 
a value of 1 (0 otherwise).  Finally, I created a firm level measure of prestigious core 
executive role experience by these summing these values for each IPO firm core 
executive. 
Mediating Variables 
Prestigious Strategic Alliance Partners 
I developed a measure of the number of alliances with prestigious alliance 
partners held by newly public firms by collecting data from the SDC’s Mergers and 
Acquisitions (SDC M&A) data base.  This data base contains information on a broad 
range of firms and strategic alliances.  For each of my 1997 IPO firms I identified all of 
their firm alliance partners from 1997 to 2001 in the SDC M&A data base.  I then created 
an annual count of publicly traded strategic alliance partners by summing the number of 
publicly traded strategic alliance partners each IPO firm formed alliances with during 
that year.  Information on the publicly traded status of each IPO firm strategic alliance 
partner was collected from SDC M&A.  This variable, prestigious alliance partners, was 
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logged and lagged one year when testing all hypotheses, with the exception of 
hypothesis 6, which treats this measure as the dependent variable.  In this case I did not 
log the prestigious alliance partners DV in order to preserve its count nature. 
Dedicated Institutional Investment 
Broadly speaking, in order to capture the amount of dedicated institutional 
investment in each of my sample IPO firms I characterize 1) the nature of investment 
behavior of each of the individual institutional investors who own equity in at least one 
of my sample firms, 2) characterize the nature of institutional investment in each IPO 
firm based upon its’ institutional investors’ prior investment behavior, and 3) gauge the 
overall amount of dedicated institutional investment in each of my sample firms.  
Consequently, I develop measures of individual institutional investor dedication based 
upon the nature of individual institutional investor portfolio investment behavior.  In 
turn, I then utilize these measures of individual institutional investor dedication as a 
basis for creating a measure of the overall amount of dedicated of institutional 
investment in each of my sample IPO firms used in testing my hypotheses.  The specific 
procedures and data sources that I rely upon to do so are outlined below. 
As previously discussed in Chapter IV, dedicated institutional investors are 
characterized by, “large, long-term holdings, which are concentrated in only a few 
firms” (Bushee, 1998:310).  Consequently, I created the following two measures for 
each of the individual institutional investors that own equity in at least one of my sample 
firms in order to characterize the nature of their investment behavior.  First, I created a 
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measure of portfolio stability to address the variability of institutional investor portfolio 
holdings that I adapted from Bushee (1998).  The formula to calculate this variable can 
be expressed as follows: 
PSi = (∑Wk - ∑∆Wk) / ∑Wk 
where, 
Wk is the two year total of the quarterly portfolio weights (shares held times 
stock price at quarters end) in firm k reported at the end of each quarter; 
∆Wk is the two year total of the absolute value of quarterly portfolio weight 
changes in firm k reported at the end of each quarter; 
Portfolio stability (PSi) thus represents the percentage of an institutional 
investor’s equity portfolio that does not change during the last two years. 
Second, I also created a measure of institutional investor portfolio concentration 
(PCi).  I created this variable by calculating the average percentage of an institutional 
investor’s portfolio invested in each of its holdings.  The formula to calculate this 
variable can be express as follows: 
PCi = (∑Wk / ∑NSTKt) / ∑Wk  
where, 
Wk is the one year total of the quarterly portfolio weights (shares held times 
stock price at quarters end) in firm k reported at the end of each quarter;  
NSTKt represents the total number of stocks owned by institutional investor i at 
the end of each quarter for one calendar year. 
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Having developed measures of individual institutional investor dedication based 
on the nature of individual institutional investor portfolio investment behavior I used the 
portfolio stability (PSi), and portfolio concentration (PCi) measures of individual 
institutional investors discussed above to capture the overall nature of each IPO firm’s 
institutional investment.  First, for each sample firm I created a sum of weighted average 
of institutional investor portfolio stabilities (APSk).  I assigned the weights for these 
averages based upon the percentage of IPO firm institutional investment owned by each 
individual institutional investor.  The formula to calculate this variable can be express as 
follows: 
APSk = ∑[PSik * (Iik/Ik)] 
where, 
PSik represents the portfolio stability of firm k’s ith institutional investor;  
Iik represents the number of shares in firm k owned by institutional investor i at 
the year’s end; 
Ik represents the total shares of firm k’s stock owned by institutional investors at 
the year’s end4. 
For each sample firm I also created an average of institutional investor portfolio 
concentration.  I created a sum of weighted average of institutional investor portfolio 
stabilities (APCk).  I assigned the weights for these averages based upon the percentage 
                                                 
4 Except in cases in which an institutional investor did not report at the years end, in 
which cases I utilized the data reported by that institutional investor closed to the year’s end. 
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of IPO firm institutional investment owned by each individual institutional investor.  The 
formula to calculate this variable can be express as follows: 
APCk = ∑[PCik * (Iik/Ik)] 
where, 
PCik represents the portfolio concentration of firm k’s i’th institutional investor; 
Iik represents the number of shares in firm k owned by institutional investor i at 
the year’s end; 
Ik represents that total shares of firm k’s stock owned by institutional investors at 
the year’s end. 
To create the final measures of the amount of dedicated institutional investment 
in each IPO firm used in testing my hypotheses (IISk and IICk), I multiplied the sum of 
weighted average of institutional investor portfolio stabilities (APCk) and the sum of 
weighted average of institutional investor portfolio stabilities (APSk) by the total 
percentage of IPO firm equity owned by all institutional investors.  The mathematical 
formula to express this can be represented as follows: 
IISk = APSk * (Ik / Sk) 
IICk = APCk * (Ik / Sk) 
where, 
Ik represents that total shares of firm k’s stock owned by institutional investors at 
the year’s end; 
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Sk represents the number of shares of firm k’s common stock outstanding at the 
year’s end.5 
These two final measures of dedicated institutional investment, i.e., institutional 
investment stability (IISk) and institutional investment concentration (IICk)6, were added 
to one and logged (natural logarithm) and updated annually.  Additionally, these 
variables were lagged on year. 
The data used to create these measures of the amount of dedicated institutional 
investment were drawn from the CDA/Spectrum Institutional Ownership Database 
(CDA) from Thomson Financial Publishing accessible through Wharton Research Data 
Systems.  CDA collects ownership information on all institutions required to file an SEC 
form 13-f.  As Higgins and Gulati (2006:9) note, “The Spectrum database ‘reverse’-
compiles this information so that information may be obtained for companies invested 
in, rather than the company doing the investing”.  Utilizing this information I was able to 
identify institutional investors who own equity in my sample firms as well as 
characterize their investment behavior. 
                                                 
5 The last reported valued was utilized in instances in which data was not available at the 
calendar year end. 
6 After initially calculating this variable I found its mean to be fairly small.  As a result, I 
subsequently multiplied this variable by 100 in order to ensure there existed decimal spaces 
sufficient to for the calculations conducted when running statistical analysis. 
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Controls 
Firm Age 
A central premise of this study is that newly public firms face a liability of 
market newness (Certo, 2003).  While this liability is highly relevant to the IPO setting 
IPO firms may also suffer the liability of newness referred to by institutional theorists as 
well (Freeman et al., 1983; Singh et al., 1986).  Institutional theory suggests that young 
IPO firms may derive greater benefits from managerial prestige than their older 
counterparts as a result of the liability of newness (Freeman et al., 1983; Singh et al., 
1986).  As such, in this study I control for firm age.  To measure firm age I calculated 
the natural logarithm of one plus the firm’s age at the time of its IPO.  The data for this 
measure was collected from Jay Ritter’s IPO website which provides information on the 
date of IPO firm incorporation. 
IPO Firm Size 
Institutional theory also suggests that small firms may derive greater benefits 
from managerial prestige than their larger counterparts as a result of the liability of 
smallness (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Freeman et al., 1983).  Accordingly, except when 
modeling firm growth, I controlled for firm size as follows.  I included a measure of firm 
size based on the natural log of one plus firm revenues.  I drew firm revenue data from 
Compustat.  This variable was lagged one year, logged to correct for skewness (natural 
log of 1+firm revenues), and updated annually. 
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Underwriter Prestige 
Prior research suggests that underwriters play a key role in certifying IPO firms 
to public markets (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Carter et al., 1998).  In order to measure 
underwriter prestige I rely upon the widely used Carter-Manaster measure of 
underwriter prestige (Ritter & Welch, 2002).  This measure is based on analyses of 
underwriter position in IPO tombstone announcements.  To correct for skewness, I took 
the natural logarithm of this variable. 
Venture Capital Backing 
I control for firm venture capital (VC) backing with a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a firm is VC backed at the time of its IPO.  A number of studies suggest 
that  venture capitalists may influence IPO firm performance and outcomes (6 et al., 
2004; Daily et al., 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Jain & Kini, 2000).  The data 
necessary to construct this measure was collected from the (SDC) Global New Issues 
database. 
IPO Performance7 
By undergoing the IPO process, firms raise capital from investors.  While various 
measures of IPO firm performance exist, one of the commonly utilized is IPO under 
pricing.  In this study I rely upon IPO under pricing to indicate firm IPO performance.  
                                                 
7 Missing values for IPO under pricing and IPO proceeds were replaced with sample 
mean values for 13 sample firms.   
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IPO under pricing represents both money left on the table for the IPO firm and a means 
to achieve organizational legitimacy (Daily et al., 2003a; Pollock et al., 2002).  I 
measure IPO under pricing by taking the natural log of one plus the percentage change 
in stock price between the initial price set for the stock and the closing price of the stock 
on the first day of trading (Pollock et al., 2002). 
I also controlled for IPO proceeds, which represent the financial resources 
garnered as a result of the IPO.  Prior research suggest firms with greater IPO proceeds 
may be more capable of funding firm growth and expansion (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; 
Jain & Kini, 2000).  I calculated this variable by taking the natural logarithm of the 
product of the total number of shares offered and the share price at the end of the first 
day of trading.  I collected the data on IPO under pricing and proceeds from the (SDC) 
Global New Issues database. 
Pre-IPO Alliances 
I also collected data from the SDC M&A data base to identify and control for 
firm alliances formed before the IPO.  Pre-IPO alliance activity may influence 
subsequent growth and survival of IPO firms (Stuart et al., 1999).  This measure 
represents the natural logarithm of one plus the count of the number of pre-IPO alliances 
identified in the SDC M&A data base. 
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High Tech Industry 
Consistent with prior research I controlled for firm industry with a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm is from a high technology industry or not (Certo et al., 
2001a; Fischer & Pollock, 2004).  Firms in high tech industries may experience greater 
growth as well as higher failure rates.  I collected the data required to create this 
dichotomous variable from the (SDC) Global New Issues database. 
Profitability 
I also control for firm profitability by calculating 100 times firm return on assets 
(ROA).  I drew the data on firm income and assets required to calculate this variable 
from Compustat.  This variable was updated annually, logged8, and lagged one year. 
Board Size 
I also controlled for board size at the time of the IPO.  Prior research suggests 
that firms with larger boards have greater access to external resources (Dalton et al., 
1999).  To create this variable I calculated the natural logarithm of one plus the total 
number of directors on a sample firm’s board.  I collected the data needed to create this 
variable from each firm’s IPO prospectus. 
                                                 
8 Because the range of this variable extended into negative numbers I took the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the absolute value of the sample minimum ROA value added to firm ROA. 
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TMT Size 
Prior research also suggests that TMT size may also influence firm performance 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  As such, I also controlled for TMT size.  I developed this variable by calculating 
the natural logarithm of one plus the number of executive officers listed in each firms 
IPO prospectus. 
TMT Tenure 
I control for average TMT tenure by taking the natural log of 1 plus the average 
of executive tenures with an IPO firm as reported in the IPO prospectus.  Firms 
possessing TMTs with substantial experience working together may be better able to 
coordinate and implement firm growth initiatives (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Kor & Mahoney, 2000; Penrose, 1959).  The information needed to calculate this 
measure was also collected from each firm’s IPO prospectus. 
IPO CEO Turnover 
I also controlled for the turnover of the IPO CEO turnover following the IPO.  
Prior research has demonstrated that executive turnover precedes firm failures (Cannella 
et al., 2002; D’Aveni, 1990).  CEO turnover was coded as 0 in years during which the 
CEO at the time of a firm’s IPO still held the title of CEO and as 1 in years in which 
someone other than the CEO at the time of the IPO held the CEO title.  The data utilized 
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to construct this variable was collected from firm proxy statements, other SEC filings, 
and the world wide web. 
Statistical Methods 
I utilized random coefficient growth modeling, Cox proportional hazards 
analysis, time series cross-sectional negative binomial regression, and time series cross-
sectional generalized least squares regression to test the hypotheses.  All of these 
statistical modeling techniques are multivariate in form, and take into account the nature 
of the measures previously discussed in this chapter. 
Random Coefficient Growth Modeling 
First, to test the hypotheses regarding post-IPO firm growth I utilized random 
coefficient growth models (RCM) (Singer, 1998).  RCM’s are particularly adept at 
examining the influence of predictors measured at one point in time on subsequent 
subject growth patterns (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Chen, 2005).  In general, the statistical 
model of random coefficient growth models can be expressed as follows: 
Level 1:  Yij = π0j + π1j (timeij) + rij 
Level 2:  π0j = β00 + β01(Xj) + u0j 
π1j = β10 + β11(Xj) + u1j 
where, 
Yij = DV score for individual/unit j at time i; 
π0j = Level 1 intercept (initial score on the DV) for individual/unit j; 
π1j = Time–DV slope for individual/unit j; 
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X = Individual/unit-level predictor; 
β‘s = Level 2 intercepts and slopes; 
rij = Level 1 residual; u0j & u1j = Level 2 residuals. 
Cox Proportional Hazard Analysis 
To test the hypotheses regarding post-IPO firm failure I utilized Cox proportional 
hazard analysis (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991).  Event history analysis, or Hazard 
analysis, is concerned with the patterns and correlates of event occurrence (Yamaguchi, 
1991).  Hazard analysis is particularly well suited to analyze longitudinal data where the 
outcome of interests represents a discrete event, and the timing of that event’s 
occurrence is of central interest (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991).  A Cox proportional 
hazard model was selected over other forms of hazard analysis for multiple reasons.  
First, similar to other research examining post-IPO outcome (Li, 2004), I chose a Cox 
model because the interval between the IPO date and the end of the first fiscal year are 
not equal across sample firms, which unlike other forms of hazard analysis, relaxes this 
assumption.  Second, proportional hazards models do not require researchers to specify 
the how time influences the outcome of interest.  Third, Yamaguchi (1991) notes that 
proportional hazards model represents a popular approach in terms of analyzing the 
timing of event occurrence.  The Cox proportional hazard model may generally be 
specified as follows (Rabe-Hesketh & Everitt, 2007; Yamaguchi, 1991): 
hi(t) = h0(t)exp[∑bkXik(t)] 
where, 
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h0(t) represents the baseline hazard function; 
Xik(t) represents the value of the kth co-variate for firm i at time t. 
Similar to prior studies examining firm failure (Fischer & Pollock, 2004), the 
data in this study were measured at the firm-year level.  As noted previously, firm failure 
was coded 1 if a sample firm failed in that year, and coded 0 otherwise for each firm 
year.  As a result, in this study the hazard of sample firm failure at time t represents the 
probability of firm failure during the interval t to t+1. 
Time Series Cross Sectional Negative Binomial Regression 
To test hypothesis 5 regarding the number of post-IPO prestigious strategic 
alliance partners I estimated random effects time series cross-sectional negative binomial 
regression (TSNB) models (Long, 1997; Long & Freese, 2003).  This form of statistical 
analysis was chosen for several reasons.  First, a negative binomial regression model was 
selected because of the count nature of the post-IPO strategic alliance partner variable 
used as the dependent variable.  Second, a negative binomial regression model was 
selected over a Poisson model (another method of analyzing count data) in order to 
control for possible over-dispersion.  Over-dispersion violates the Poisson regression 
assumption of conditional variances being equal to conditional means (Long, 1997; 
Long & Freese, 2003).  Third, TSNB was selected rather than a traditional negative 
binomial regression because of the longitudinal nature of the post-IPO alliance partner 
counts used as the dependent variable (Zeger, 1998).  The specification of TSNB 
controls for auto-correlation and hetero-skedasticity, which are symptomatic of 
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longitudinal analysis (Conway, 1990).  Fifth, a random effects model was chosen 
because of the time-variant and time-invariant nature of the various predictors utilized in 
testing Hypothesis 5.  Lastly, following the recommendations of Certo and Semadeni 
(2006) regarding the analysis of cross-sectionally dominated data sets with random 
effects models, time dummies were included in the model to control for 
contemporaneous correlations. 
Time Series Cross Sectional Generalized Least Squares Regression 
In order to test hypothesis 6 regarding dedicated institutional investment I 
estimated random effects time series cross sectional generalized least squares regression 
models (random effects).  The random effects model may generally be specified as 
follows (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2005): 
yit = (β1 + ζt) β2x2it + βpxpit + εit 
where, 
yit represents the vector of dependent variables of the ith observation at 
time t; 
β1 + ζt represents the firm specific intercept; 
βp represents the vector of estimated coefficients of independent variables 
and control variables;  
xpit represents the vector of independent variables or control variables for 
the ith observation at time t; 
εit represents the estimation error of the ith observation at time t. 
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Due to the longitudinal nature of this study, the sample observations are unlikely 
to be statistically independent (Certo & Semadeni, 2006).  As a result, controlling for 
potential coefficient biases stemming from serial correlation, contemporaneous 
correlation of estimate residuals, and heteroskedasticty is necessary (Certo & Semadeni, 
2006; Maddala, 1992).  Time series cross sectional models correct for these potential 
sources of bias (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2005).  A random effects model was chosen 
due to the time-variant and time-invariant nature of the various predictors utilized in 
testing hypothesis 6.  Finally, following the recommendations of Certo and Semadeni 
(2006) regarding the analysis of cross-sectionally dominated data sets with random 
effects models, time dummies were included in the model to control for 
contemporaneous correlations. 
Summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the methodology used to 
empirically test the hypothesized relationships stated in Chapter III.  Accordingly, I 
discussed the sample selection procedures, operationalization of theoretical constructs, 
and statistical methods implemented to test the hypotheses developed in the present 
study.
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss empirical evidence regarding support for 
the hypotheses developed in Chapter III.  A summary of the results of hypotheses tests is 
provided in Table 2.  This chapter is divided into six primary sections.  The first 
summarizes the sample data sets utilized in this study.  The second section presents the 
result of hypotheses dealing with the relationship between managerial prestige and post 
IPO firm performance.  The third section reports the results regarding the impact of 
dedicated institutional investment and prestigious strategic alliance partners and firm 
performance.  The fourth section discusses empirical evidence regarding the role of 
managerial prestige in garnering the support of key external resource holders.  A fifth 
section treats the mediated effects of dedicated institutional investment and prestigious 
strategic alliance partners on the positive influence of managerial prestige on firm 
performance.  The finals section summarizes the empirical results of this study.
. 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Hypothesis Models Tested Support No Support 
1) Elite executive educational credentials at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO firm performance.   5b, 5d, 6b, and 6d 
Partially supported:  
Undergraduate prestige is 
positively related to firm growth 
 
2) 
Executive prior managerial experiences in prestigious firms 
at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO 
firm performance. 
5b, 5d, 6b, and 6d  X 
3) 
Prior core executive role experiences in prestigious firms at 
the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO 
firm performance. 
5b, 5d, 6b, and 6d  X 
4) 
Executive external directorships in prestigious firms at the 
time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO firm 
performance. 
5b, 5d, 6b, and 6d 
 
X 
5) 
The number of post-IPO strategic alliances formed with 
prestigious firms is positively associated with post-IPO firm 
performance.   
5c, 5d, 6c, and 6d 
Partially Supported:  Prestigious 
alliance partners are negatively 
related to firm failure 
 
6) 
The amount of dedicated institutional investment in a newly 
public firm is positively associated with post-IPO firm 
performance. 
5c, 5d, 6c, and 6d 
Partially Supported:  Institutional 
investment stability is negatively 
related to firm failure 
  
. 
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TABLE 2 
Continued 
Hypothesis Models Tested Support No Support 
7) 
Executive managerial prestige at the time of the IPO is 
positively related to the number of post-IPO strategic 
alliances entered into with prestigious alliance partners.   
7b 
Partially Supported:  Executive 
undergraduate prestige is 
positively related to the number of 
prestigious alliance partners.  
8) Executive managerial prestige at the time of the IPO is positively related to dedicated institutional investment.   8b, and 8d  X 
9) 
The positive relationship between managerial prestige at the 
time of a firm’s IPO and post-IPO firm performance is 
positively and partially mediated by the number of post-IPO 
strategic alliances that a newly public firm enters into with 
prestigious firms.   
5b, 5c, 5d, 6b, 6c, 6d, 
and 7b 
 
X 
10) 
The positive relationship between managerial prestige at the 
time of a firm’s IPO and post-IPO firm performance is 
positively and partially mediated by the amount of dedicated 
institutional investment in a newly public firm. 
5b, 5c, 5d, 6b, 6c, 6d, 
8b and 8d 
  
X 
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Sample Summary 
This study relied upon two separate data sets to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter III.  The first data set (Data 1) consisted of data collected at the time of the IPO 
and up to five year after the IPO (1997-2001).  I analyzed Data 1 in hypotheses tests 
utilizing TSNB, random effects, and Cox Proportional models.  Data 1 has 1683 
observations on 379 sample firms.  The longitudinal structure of Data 1 was based upon 
CRSP delisting codes.  Specifically, sample firms for which no delisting codes were 
provided were included in the sample for the full five years of the sample window.  
Firms for which any type of delisting code was provided by CRSP during the sample 
window were censored for the years following their delisting.  This study’s focus on firm 
adaptation to public trading was the primary rationale for structuring the sample in this 
manner. 
When constructing this data set missing data presented an issue for sample firm 
financial and institutional investment variables.  This was evidenced by preliminary 
analyses using only the raw data which excluded 30 of the 72 instances of firm failure in 
this sample.  In order to address this issue, missing data points for firm size (141 obs.), 
ROA (141 obs.), institutional investment stability (33 obs.), and institutional investment 
concentration (33 obs.), were replaced with firm means.  The exception to this was in 
instances where firm data for the entire case was missing.  In such cases, sample 
averages were substituted instead (4 cases for ROA and firm size, 7 cases for institutional 
investment concentration and stability).  An additional missing data issue was present by 
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lagging institutional investment stability and institutional investment concentration one 
year9.  This resulted in missing data during for the year of 1997.  In order to address this 
issue missing institutional investment stability (379 obs.) and institutional investment 
concentration (379 obs.) data were replaced with their respective values from 1998. 
The second data set (Data 2) is a duplicate of Data 1 with the exception that it 
consisted of data ranging from one year prior to the IPO up to five years after the IPO 
(1996-2001).  Data 2 was utilized in hypotheses tests utilizing RCM.  A time range of 
1996 to 2001 rather than 1997 to 2001 was used for Data 2 in order to capture firm 
growth that occurs during the period immediately following the IPO.  Data 2 contains 
2062 observations on 379 sample firms.  Data 2, as a quasi-duplicate of Data 1 exhibited 
similar missing data patterns as Data 1.  Accordingly, missing data in Data 2 was 
generally treated in the same manner as Data 2.  Exceptions to this stem from including 
observations from 1996 in Data 2, which created additional missing data issues with 
regard to the data needed to calculate ROA and the dedicated institutional investment 
variables.  As a result of the lack of data, additional missing values for firm ROA in 1996 
(88 obs.) were replaced in the same manner as in Data 1.  Additionally institutional 
                                                 
9 Data from 1996 on institutional investment in my IPO firms is missing because 
institutional investors filing SEC form 13f (i.e., those in the Thomsen data) are only required to 
report their holdings of publicly traded securities.  Given that my sample IPO firms were not 
publicly traded in 1996 lagging institutional investment variables one year creates missing values 
in 1997.  However, if I do not lag the institutional investment variables, values for these 
variables in years in which a firm is de-listed are likely to be biased or missing because 
institutional investment may be not reported for de-listed firms at the year’s end.  Results of 
supplementary RCM and Cox analysis with and without lagging the institutional investment data 
were substantively the same, with the lagged results being more conservative in their support of 
this study’s hypotheses.   
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investment stability (379 obs.) and institutional investment concentration (379 obs.) in 
1996 were replaced with values from 1997. 
Sample means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients are reported in 
Tables 3 and 4 for Data 1 and Data 2, respectively.  All correlations greater than .048 in 
Table 3 are statistically significant (p<.05).  All correlations greater than .043 in Table 4 
are statistically significant (p<.05).  Not surprisingly, sample means, standard deviations 
and correlations in Table 3 are similar to those listed in Table 4.  Additionally, most of 
the strong correlations reported in Tables 3 and 4 are fairly intuitive.  For example, TMT 
tenure is strongly correlated with firm age.  Additionally, firm size/revenues are 
positively and strongly correlated with underwriter prestige and IPO proceeds.  Pre-IPO 
alliances also exhibit a strong positive correlation with prestigious alliances.  Finally, 
prestigious managerial experience exhibits a strong positive correlation with prestigious 
core role experience.
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TABLE 3a 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations - Data 1 (1997 to 2001) 
# Variable obs mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 firm failure 1683 0.043 0.202          
2 firm age 1683 2.193 0.996 -0.070         
3 firm size 1683 4.162 1.677 -0.023 0.320        
4 underwriter prestige 1683 1.912 0.418 -0.156 0.125 0.418       
5 venture capital backing 1683 0.332 0.471 -0.006 -0.148 -0.228 0.136      
6 under-pricing 1683 0.106 0.379 0.010 -0.081 -0.024 0.033 -0.044     
7 IPO proceeds 1683 17.519 0.976 -0.090 0.125 0.553 0.558 -0.134 0.392    
8 pre-IPO alliances 1683 0.116 0.339 -0.051 0.031 -0.027 0.102 0.157 0.064 0.132   
9 hi-tech industry 1683 0.450 0.498 -0.008 -0.123 -0.101 -0.045 0.219 0.095 -0.031 0.063  
10 ROA 1683 6.023 0.217 -0.127 0.098 0.233 0.067 -0.169 0.008 0.103 -0.057 -0.059 
11 board size 1683 1.975 0.305 0.014 0.048 0.074 0.096 0.072 -0.023 0.113 0.051 -0.105 
12 TMT size 1683 1.969 0.359 -0.015 0.139 0.261 0.277 0.084 -0.010 0.276 0.066 0.021 
13 TMT tenure 1683 1.558 0.723 -0.100 0.600 0.207 0.052 -0.153 -0.054 0.040 0.087 -0.111 
14 CEO turnover 1683 0.053 0.224 0.199 0.004 0.017 -0.057 0.003 0.014 -0.011 -0.016 0.005 
15 undergraduate prestige 1683 2.755 2.966 -0.003 -0.027 -0.187 0.013 0.165 0.087 -0.099 0.160 0.150 
16 prestigious managerial experience 1683 0.547 0.581 -0.011 -0.145 0.079 0.194 0.236 0.089 0.198 0.127 0.093 
17 prestigious core role experience 1683 0.133 0.301 0.016 -0.048 0.073 0.111 0.141 0.089 0.129 0.096 0.018 
18 prestigious external directorates 1683 0.141 0.358 -0.009 0.074 0.084 0.082 0.022 0.045 0.199 0.091 -0.030 
19 prestigious alliance partners 1683 0.113 0.334 -0.039 -0.075 0.063 0.106 0.150 0.080 0.129 0.329 0.163 
20 prestigious alliance partners DV 1683 0.217 0.793 -0.032 -0.079 0.079 0.099 0.150 0.077 0.121 0.281 0.156 
21 II concentration 1683 0.047 0.101 -0.050 0.005 0.080 0.148 0.085 0.037 0.164 0.110 0.034 
22 II stability 1683 0.177 0.119 -0.110 0.152 0.400 0.354 0.048 0.079 0.461 0.034 -0.039 
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TABLE 3 
Continueda 
# Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
11 board size -0.036            
12 TMT size 0.019 0.092           
13 TMT tenure 0.108 -0.110 0.014          
14 CEO turnover -0.048 0.048 -0.018 -0.064         
15 undergraduate prestige -0.094 -0.030 0.095 -0.012 -0.005        
16 prestigious managerial experience -0.069 0.135 0.280 -0.298 0.053 0.073       
17 prestigious core role experience -0.049 0.072 0.151 -0.125 0.019 0.017 0.495      
18 prestigious external directorates -0.016 0.123 0.170 -0.024 0.005 -0.047 0.241 0.138     
19 prestigious alliance partners -0.075 0.032 0.093 -0.088 -0.011 0.153 0.172 0.089 0.076    
20 prestigious alliance partners DV -0.065 0.040 0.094 -0.097 0.009 0.144 0.173 0.094 0.085 0.938   
21 II concentration -0.008 0.091 0.005 0.034 -0.025 -0.046 0.061 0.060 0.065 0.019 0.022  
22 II stability 0.082 0.084 0.162 0.092 -0.029 -0.151 0.061 0.058 0.114 0.052 0.046 0.302 
a All correlations greater than |.047| are statistically significant at p<.05 
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TABLE 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations - Data 2 (1996 to 2001) 
# Variable Obs Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 firm revenues 1796 4.187 1.691          
2 time 2062 2.296 1.650 0.201         
3 firm age 2062 2.191 0.997 0.323 0.004        
4 underwriter prestige 2062 1.909 0.421 0.406 0.027 0.120       
5 venture capital backing 2062 0.331 0.471 -0.220 -0.010 -0.161 0.141      
6 under-pricing 2062 0.106 0.376 0.011 0.021 -0.056 0.061 -0.016     
7 IPO proceeds 2062 17.514 0.977 0.572 0.017 0.150 0.570 -0.120 0.358    
8 pre-IPO alliances 2062 0.115 0.337 -0.027 0.005 0.032 0.107 0.164 0.067 0.140   
9 hi-tech industry 2062 0.450 0.498 -0.085 0.006 -0.130 -0.042 0.221 0.095 -0.030 0.045  
10 ROA 2062 6.881 0.063 0.356 -0.008 0.144 0.113 -0.236 0.031 0.159 -0.088 -0.054 
11 board size 2062 1.975 0.305 0.078 0.003 0.010 0.104 0.080 -0.009 0.135 0.052 -0.095 
12 TMT size 2062 1.969 0.358 0.258 0.000 0.148 0.275 0.080 0.008 0.278 0.066 0.019 
13 TMT tenure 2062 1.556 0.723 0.208 0.007 0.619 0.053 -0.158 -0.039 0.066 0.093 -0.117 
14 CEO turnover 2062 0.043 0.203 0.008 0.236 0.010 -0.035 0.006 -0.003 -0.011 -0.020 -0.003 
15 undergraduate prestige 2062 2.750 2.965 -0.167 0.024 -0.007 0.030 0.154 0.089 -0.098 0.159 0.135 
16 prestigious managerial experience 2062 0.546 0.580 0.081 0.003 -0.125 0.191 0.232 0.085 0.172 0.135 0.098 
17 prestigious core role experience 2062 0.132 0.301 0.085 0.018 -0.028 0.112 0.132 0.095 0.118 0.112 0.018 
18 prestigious external directorates 2062 0.141 0.357 0.087 -0.004 0.101 0.081 0.011 0.043 0.177 0.098 -0.025 
19 prestigious alliance partners 2062 0.096 0.309 0.086 0.147 -0.061 0.105 0.136 0.079 0.117 0.311 0.115 
20 II concentration 2062 0.047 0.101 0.092 0.019 -0.005 0.145 0.076 0.032 0.160 0.104 0.036 
21 II stability 2062 0.174 0.116 0.412 0.121 0.158 0.341 0.029 0.072 0.452 0.018 -0.049 
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TABLE 4 
Continued 
# Variable 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 board size -0.069           
12 TMT size 0.047 0.095          
13 TMT tenure 0.135 -0.108 0.022         
14 CEO turnover -0.022 0.039 -0.033 -0.052        
15 undergraduate prestige -0.101 0.002 0.111 -0.013 -0.005       
16 prestigious managerial experience -0.076 0.143 0.256 -0.277 0.039 0.076      
17 prestigious core role experience -0.049 0.082 0.142 -0.100 0.022 0.016 0.488     
18 prestigious external directorates -0.021 0.106 0.141 0.009 -0.008 -0.057 0.190 0.116    
19 prestigious alliance partners -0.028 0.025 0.091 -0.075 0.004 0.149 0.159 0.080 0.056   
20 II concentration 0.009 0.099 -0.007 0.035 -0.022 -0.071 0.050 0.052 0.060 0.006  
21 II stability 0.153 0.074 0.151 0.114 -0.029 -0.172 0.028 0.038 0.090 0.037 0.299 
a All correlations greater than |.042| are statistically significant at p<.05 
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Managerial Prestige and Post-IPO Firm Growth and Failure 
Having discussed the nature of the samples used in this study I now discuss the 
tests of the hypotheses developed in Chapter III.  The theoretical model developed in 
Chapter III posits a total of four hypotheses regarding the direct effects of managerial 
prestige on post IPO firm performance.  Specifically, I argued that while top managers 
of newly public firms have substantial motivations to pursue strategies that ensure the 
survival and growth of their respective firms, they face liabilities of market newness 
which may limit their ability to do so.  Drawing upon insights from the resource based 
view (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) and upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984), I proposed that elite educational credentials, prestigious managerial experience, 
prestigious core executive role experience, and prestigious external directorships would 
positively influence post-IPO firm failure and growth rates. 
Prestigious Educational Credentials 
The first hypothesis I developed focuses on the prestige of managerial 
educational background.  Specifically, in this hypothesis I argued that the possession of 
elite educational credentials would allow top managers to better deal with and adapt to 
the challenges faced by new public firms.  I proposed that elite educational credentials 
embody human and social capital resources which aid top executives in addressing the 
resource constraints and adaptation requirements confronted by newly public firms.  
Accordingly, this first hypothesis formally states:  Hypothesis 1:  Prestigious executive 
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educational credentials at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO 
firm performance. 
Models 5b and 5d of Table 5 present the results of this hypothesis with regard to 
firm failure.  No support for this hypothesis is found with regard to firm failure.  This is 
evidenced by lack of statistical significance for the coefficients of undergraduate 
prestige in both model 5b (b=-.006) and model 5d (b=-.002).  Models 6b and 6d of 
Table 6 present the results of Hypothesis 1 regarding firm growth.  Consistent with prior 
research analyzing rates of change utilizing RCM (Chen, 2005), this is determined by 
examining the coefficients of time*undergraduate prestige.  In both model 6b (b=.010; 
p<.10) and model 6d (b=.008; p<.10) the coefficients for time*undergraduate prestige 
are positive and moderately significant.  This suggests that executive undergraduate 
educational prestige positively influences post-IPO growth rates.  Based upon the 
combined results presented in Tables 5 and 6, Hypothesis 1 receives partial support.
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TABLE 5 
Cox Proportional Hazard Model Coefficient Estimates of IPO Firm Failure 
Variable Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 5d 
firm age -0.126  -0.151  -0.154  -0.170  
firm size 0.221 ** 0.254 ** 0.304 *** 0.331 *** 
underwriter prestige -1.286 *** -1.267 *** -1.198 *** -1.179 *** 
venture capital backing 0.138  0.208  0.252  0.283  
under-pricing 1.224  1.079  1.807  1.678  
IPO proceeds -0.399 † -0.413 † -0.249  -0.256  
pre-IPO alliances -1.079  -0.919  -0.782  -0.671  
hi-tech industry -0.479 † -0.455 † -0.479 † -0.466 † 
ROA -0.535 *** -0.543 ** -0.895 *** -0.902 *** 
board size 0.048  0.137  0.009  0.094  
TMT size 0.425  0.545  0.415  0.511  
TMT tenure -0.442 * -0.499 * -0.406 * -0.465 * 
CEO turnover 1.716 *** 1.711 *** 1.550 *** 1.542 *** 
undergraduate prestige   -0.006    -0.002  
prestigious managerial experience   -0.410    -0.379  
prestigious core role experience   0.314    0.338  
prestigious external directorates   0.125    0.194  
prestigious alliance partners     -1.114 † -1.112 † 
II concentration     -2.059  -1.852  
II stability         -4.188 * -4.235 * 
N 1683  1683  1683  1683  
# IPO Firm Failures 72  72  72  72  
Chi-square 166.73  186.51  175.45  190.80  
Chi-square p-value <.001   <.001   <.001   <.001   
 † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001  
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TABLE 6 
RCM Parameter Estimates of Predictors of Post-IPO Firm Growth 
Variable Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c Model 6d 
Intercept -19.470 *** -18.443 *** -17.910 *** -17.105 *** 
time -3.338 *** -3.507 *** -3.168 *** -3.298 *** 
firm age 0.262 *** 0.275 *** 0.250 ** 0.263 *** 
underwriter prestige 0.532 ** 0.564 ** 0.499 ** 0.530 ** 
venture capital backing -0.558 *** -0.542 *** -0.590 *** -0.579 *** 
under-pricing -0.940 *** -0.850 *** -0.898 *** -0.824 *** 
IPO proceeds 0.770 *** 0.721 *** 0.688 *** 0.651 *** 
pre-IPO alliances -0.360 † -0.263  -0.397 * -0.319 † 
hi-tech industry -0.034  0.006  -0.010  0.022  
ROA 1.001 *** 0.963 *** 0.949 *** 0.918 *** 
board size -0.027  -0.013  -0.018  -0.009  
TMT size 0.427 * 0.487 ** 0.455 * 0.495 ** 
TMT tenure 0.461 *** 0.459 *** 0.442 *** 0.450 *** 
CEO turnover 0.856 *** 0.839 *** 0.873 *** 0.859 *** 
undergraduate prestige   -0.069 ** 0.368 *** -0.062 ** 
prestigious managerial experience   0.060  0.051  0.083  
prestigious core role experience   -0.039  1.706 *** -0.024  
prestigious external directorates   -0.143    -0.136  
prestigious alliance partners       0.370 *** 
II concentration       0.013  
II stability       1.537 *** 
time*firm age -0.003  -0.007  -0.001  -0.005  
time*underwriter prestige -0.050  -0.060  -0.045  -0.054  
time*venture capital backing 0.060 † 0.047  0.061 † 0.049  
time*under-pricing 0.006  -0.016  -0.003  -0.021  
time*IPO proceeds 0.056 ** 0.059 ** 0.069 ** 0.070 ** 
time*pre-IPO alliances -0.009  -0.033  -0.004  -0.023  
time*hi-tech industry 0.000  -0.005  -0.005  -0.008  
time*ROA 0.439 *** 0.461 *** 0.388 ** 0.408 *** 
time*board size 0.024  0.015  0.019  0.011  
time*TMT size -0.038  -0.065  -0.046  -0.068  
time*TMT tenure -0.173 *** -0.161 *** -0.167 *** -0.159 *** 
time*CEO turnover -0.301 *** -0.298 *** -0.301 *** -0.299 *** 
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TABLE 6 
Continued 
time*undergraduate prestige   0.010 †   0.008 † 
time*prestigious managerial experience   0.025    0.016  
time*prestigious core role experience   0.081    0.079  
time*prestigious external directorates   0.036    0.031  
time*prestigious alliance partners     -0.096 ** -0.098 ** 
time*II concentration     0.060  0.066  
time*II stability         -0.307 ** -0.268 * 
N 1796  1796  1796  1796  
# IPO firms 379  379  379  379  
Chi-square 2254.50  2232.73  2237.58  2216.30  
Chi-square p-value <.001   <.001   <.001   <.001   
† p < .10 * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001    
 
 
Prestigious Firm Managerial Experience 
My second hypothesis deals with the influence of top executive prior managerial 
experiences.  In particular this hypothesis addresses the role of executive prestigious 
prior managerial experiences.  In developing this hypothesis I argued that prestigious 
prior managerial experiences provide top managers with human and social capital 
valuable in the post-IPO context.  Specifically, I posited that prestigious managerial 
experience enables top managers to overcome the deleterious effect of the IPO process 
on post IPO firm growth and survival by facilitating access to resources and firm 
adaptation to the rigors of public trading.  This hypothesis is formally stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 2:  Executive prior managerial experiences in prestigious firms at the time of 
a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO firm performance. 
Models b and d of Table 5 present the results of Hypothesis 2 with regard to firm 
failure.  No support for this hypothesis is found with regard to firm failure.  This is 
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evidenced by the negative and statistically insignificant coefficients of prestigious 
managerial experience in both model 5b (b=-.410) and model 5d (b=-.379).  Models 6b 
and 6d of Table 6 present the results of Hypothesis 2 regarding firm growth.  Support is 
not found for this hypothesis with regard to firm growth.  This is determined by 
examining the coefficients of time*prestigious managerial experience, which in both 
model b (b=.025) and model d (b=.016) of Table 6, which are not statistically 
significant.  In summary, no support is found for Hypothesis 2. 
Prestigious Firm Core Executive Role Experience 
The third hypothesis developed in this study addressed the value of prestigious 
executive role experience in the post-IPO context.  Specifically, in developing this 
hypothesis I argued that core executive role experience in prestigious firms provides top 
managers with tacit knowledge and skills which enable them to fulfill their 
responsibilities more effectively than those without such experience.  I also posited core 
executive experience provides top executives with experience in dealing with a broad 
range of strategic, organizational, and operational issues (Roberto, 2003).  Accordingly, 
core members of a firm’s top management team may garner a substantial amount of 
experience in monitoring and controlling organizational processes and performance.  I 
argued that such experience is particularly valuable in the post-IPO context given the 
changes to organizational structure, processes and performance objectives faced by 
newly public firms, thereby contributing to firm legitimacy.  The third hypothesis 
formally proposes the following:  Hypothesis 3:  Prior core executive role experiences in 
 99 
 
 
 
prestigious firms at the time of a firm’s IPO are positively related to post-IPO firm 
performance. 
Models b and d of Tables 5 present the results of Hypothesis 3 with respect to 
firm failure.  No support is found for this hypothesis regarding firm failure.  This is 
determined by the lack of statistical significance for the coefficients of prestigious core 
role experience in both model 5b (b=.314) and model 5d (b=.379).  Models 6b and 6d of 
Table 6 present the results of Hypothesis 3 regarding firm growth.  No support is found 
for this hypothesis with respect to firm growth.  This is determined by examining the 
coefficients of time*prestigious core role experience, which, in both model 6b (b=.081) 
and model 6d (b=.079) of Table 6, are not statistically significant.  Accordingly, no 
support for this hypothesis is found for prestigious core role experience as a predictor of 
firm failure. 
Prestigious External Directorships 
The fourth hypothesis developed in Chapter III centers on the consequences of 
executive prestigious external directorships and post-IPO firm performance.  In 
developing this hypothesis I argued that the possession of prestigious external 
directorships by firm executives represents human and social capital resources which 
enhance top management’s ability to cope with and reduce the resource constraints faced 
by newly public firms as they adapt to the rigors of being publicly traded.  In developing 
these arguments I cited a number of studies documenting the access to resources, 
information, and experiences provided to executive who serve as external directors.  
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This fourth hypothesis is formally stated as follows:  Hypothesis 4:  Executive 
prestigious external directorships at the time of a firm’s IPO will be positively related to 
post-IPO firm performance. 
Models b and d of Tables 5 present the results of Hypothesis 4 with respect to 
firm failure.  No support for this hypothesis is found for prestigious external 
directorships as predictors of firm failure.  Evidence of this is found in the lack of 
statistical significance for the coefficients of prestigious external directorships in both 
model 5b (b=.125) and model 5d (b=.194).  Models 6b and 6d of Table 6 present the 
results of Hypothesis 4 regarding firm growth.  No support exists for this hypothesis 
with respect to firm growth either.  The coefficients of time* prestigious external 
directorships in both model 6b (b=.036) and model 6d (b=.031) of Table 6, are not 
statistically significant.  The combined results presented in Tables 5 and 6, demonstrate 
that Hypothesis 4 receives no support. 
Identifying Key External Resource Holders 
The theoretical model presented in Chapter III develops two hypotheses 
regarding the effect of key external resource holder support on post IPO firm 
performance.  Drawing upon prior research examining the challenges of the post-IPO 
context I argued that newly public firms face a variety of resource constraints stemming 
from the transformational nature of the IPO transition.  Applying a resource dependence 
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perspective, I argued that prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional 
investors represent two groups of key external resource holders for newly public firms. 
Prestigious Alliance Partners 
The influence of prestigious alliance partners on post-IPO firm performance are 
the focus of the fifth hypothesis developed in Chapter III.  Utilizing insights from prior 
research on the performance consequences of strategic alliances and organizational 
learning, I posited that alliances with prestigious strategic alliance partners alleviate the 
deleterious effects of the IPO transition in two ways.  First, I posited that prestigious 
strategic alliance partners may provide IPO firms with a means of conserving and 
sharing resources, thereby reducing the resources constraints synonymous with the IPO 
transition.  Second, I argued that alliances with prestigious partners serve to enhance 
organizational legitimacy.  Third, I argued that alliances with prestigious strategic 
alliance partners provide IPO firms with opportunities to internalize the processes, 
routines and structures of their prestigious strategic alliance partners.  Hypothesis 
number five is formally stated as follows:  Hypothesis 5:  The number of post-IPO 
strategic alliances formed with prestigious firms is positively associated with post-IPO 
firm performance. 
Models c and d of Tables 5 present the results of Hypothesis 5 with respect to 
firm failure.  Support for this hypothesis is found for prestigious alliances as predictors 
of firm failure.  Evidence of this is found in the statistical significance for the 
coefficients of prestigious alliances in both model 5c (b=-1.114; p<.10) and model 5d 
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(b=-1.112; p<.10).  Models 6c and 6d of Table 6 present the results of Hypothesis 5 
regarding firm growth.  No support exists for this hypothesis with respect to firm 
growth.  The coefficients of time*prestigious alliances in both model 6c (b=-.096; 
p<.01) and model 6d (b=-.098; p<.01) of Table 6, are negative and statistically 
significant.  Opposite of Hypothesis 5, this suggests that forming strategic alliances with 
prestigious firms diminishes post-IPO firm growth rates.  The combined results of 
hypothesis tests, provide partial support for Hypothesis 5. 
Dedicated Institutional Investors 
The role of dedicated institutional investment in shaping newly public firm 
performance prospects represents the focus of the seventh hypothesis developed in 
Chapter III.  Drawing upon research on institutional investment, I argued that the extent 
to which a firm’s stock is owned by dedicated institutional investors diminishes the 
amount of short-term earnings pressure faced by executives of newly public companies.  
I further argued that this lack of pressure regarding short-term earnings aids top 
executives of newly public firms in their pursuit of firm growth and survival by focusing 
their attention on other more long-term strategic and operational issues.  Thus, the sixth 
hypothesis states:  Hypothesis 6:  The amount of dedicated institutional investment in a 
newly public firm is positively associated with post-IPO firm performance. 
Models c and d of Tables 5 present the results of Hypothesis 6 with respect to 
firm failure.  Hypothesis 6 was tested using measures of institutional investment 
concentration and institutional investment stability.  No support for this hypothesis is 
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found for institutional investment concentration as a predictor of firm failure.  As 
demonstrated by the lack of statistical significance for the coefficients of institutional 
investment concentration in both model 5c (b=-2.059) and model 5d (b=-1.852).  
Support for institutional investment stability is found for Hypothesis 6 in the case of 
institutional investment stability and firm failure.  As shown in models 6c (b=-4.188; 
p<.05) and 6d (b=-4.235; p<.05) of Table 5, the coefficients for institutional investment 
stability are both negative and statistically significant.  These results suggest that 
institutional investment stability is associated with a decreased likelihood of post-IPO 
firm failure. 
Models 6c and 6d of Table 6 present the results of Hypothesis 6 with respect to 
firm growth.  No support for this hypothesis is found for institutional investment 
concentration as a predictor of firm growth.  This is determined by examining the 
coefficients of time*institutional investment concentration. In both model 6c (b=.060) 
and model 6d (b=.066) of Table 6, are not statistically significant.  The results of models 
c and d do not support Hypothesis 6 with regard to institutional investment stability and 
firm growth either.  The coefficients of time* institutional investment stability in both 
model 6c (b=-.307: p<.01) and model 6d (b=-.268; p<.05) are negative and statistically 
significant.  Contrary to Hypothesis 6, these results suggest institutional investment 
stability is negatively related to post-IPO firm growth.  In sum, the combined results 
shown in Tables 5 and 6 provide partial support for Hypothesis 6. 
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Garnering the Support of Key External Resource Holders 
The theoretical model developed in Chapter III posits a total of two hypotheses 
regarding the role of managerial prestige in garnering the support of dedicated 
institutional investors and prestigious strategic alliance partners.  Specifically I draw 
upon insights from prior research on upper echelons prestige (Certo, 2003), and resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), to argue that managerial prestige reduces 
the liability of market newness faced by newly public firms.  In doing so, managerial 
prestige thereby increases the likelihood that a newly public firm will garner the support 
of prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional investors.  Accordingly, 
hypotheses number seven and eight posit the following:  Hypothesis 7:  Executive 
managerial prestige at the time of the IPO is positively related to the number of post-
IPO strategic alliances entered into with prestigious alliance partners.  Hypothesis 8:  
Executive managerial prestige at the time of the IPO is positively related to dedicated 
institutional investment. 
Model 7b of Table 7 presents the results the test of Hypothesis 710.  Examining 
the results of model 7b show that only the coefficient (b=.091) of undergraduate 
                                                 
10 Because the managerial prestige predictors used to test Hypothesis 7 and 8 were time 
invariant I also used cross sectional approaches (OLS regression and Zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression) in supplementary analyses.  The results of the cross-sectional analyses were 
generally similar to the results utilizing longitudinal analyses.  An exception was the loss of 
support for a positive relationship between undergraduate prestige and the number of prestigious 
alliance partners when using the cross-sectional analysis.  Accordingly, the partial support 
received for Hypothesis 7 using TSCSNB should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
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prestige is statistically significant (p<.01).  This suggests that undergraduate prestige is 
positively related to the formation of alliances with prestigious alliance partner.  The 
remaining coefficients of the aspects of managerial prestige, prestigious managerial 
experience (b=.255), prestigious core role experience (b=-.149), and prestigious 
external directorates (b=.121) are not statistically significant.  Accordingly, Hypothesis 
7 receives only partial support. 
 
TABLE 7 
TSNB Estimates of Annual Prestigious Strategic Alliance Partner Counts 
Variable Model 7a Model 7b 
Intercept -3.740  -4.485 † 
firm age -0.208  -0.217  
firm size 0.052  0.070  
underwriter prestige 0.198  0.098  
venture capital backing 0.449 * 0.361  
under-pricing 0.790  0.549  
IPO proceeds 0.231  0.261 † 
pre-IPO alliances 1.453 *** 1.329 *** 
hi-tech industry 0.809 *** 0.736 *** 
ROA -0.305 † -0.270 † 
board size -0.231  -0.230  
TMT size 0.390  0.255  
TMT tenure -0.310 † -0.250  
CEO turnover -0.305  -0.314  
undergraduate prestige   0.091 ** 
prestigious managerial experience   0.255  
prestigious core role experience   -0.149  
prestigious external directorates     0.121   
N 1683  1683  
# IPO Firms 379  379  
Chi-square 173.29  182.27  
Chi-square p-value <.001   <.001   
Note:  Year dummies are included in these models, but are omitted from this table 
† p < .10; * p < .05; * p < .05; *** p < .001     
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The results of tests of Hypotheses 8 are found in Models 8b and 8d of Table 8.  
No support for this hypothesis is found for any of the aspects of managerial prestige 
examined in this study as predictors of institutional investment concentration.  This is 
determined by examining the coefficients of undergraduate prestige (b=-.002), 
prestigious managerial experience (b=<.001), prestigious core role experience (b=.009), 
and prestigious external directorates (b=.006) in model 8b; none of which are 
statistically significant.  Hypothesis 8 is not supported for any aspects of managerial 
prestige as predictors of institutional investment stability either.  The results of model 8d 
demonstrate that prestigious managerial experience (b=-.012), prestigious core role 
experience (b=.002), and prestigious external directorates (b=.011) are not statistically 
significant.  While the coefficient for undergraduate prestige (b=-.004) is statistically 
significant (p<.05) it is also negative, which is contrary to the direction posited in 
hypothesis 8.  In summary the results of models 8b and 8d found in Table 8 show no 
support for Hypothesis 8. 
The Partially-Mediated Effects of Managerial Prestige 
The final set of hypotheses developed in Chapter III deal with the role of 
prestigious strategic alliance partners and dedicated institutional investment as mediators 
of the relationship between managerial prestige and post-IPO firm performance.  In 
particular, I incorporated the theory behind the three prior sets of hypotheses to argue 
that prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional investment positively and 
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partially mediate the relationship between managerial prestige and post-IPO firm 
performance. 
 
TABLE 8 
Random Effects Estimates of IPO Firm Dedicated Institutional Investment 
 II Concentration II Stability 
Variable Model 8a Model 8b Model 8c Model 8d 
Intercept -0.214 † -0.184  -0.655 *** -0.615 *** 
firm age -0.004  -0.004  0.005  0.005  
firm size 0.000  0.000  0.016 *** 0.015 *** 
underwriter prestige 0.012  0.013  0.012  0.016  
venture capital backing 0.018 † 0.018 † 0.038 *** 0.042 *** 
under-pricing -0.007  -0.005  -0.009  -0.004  
IPO proceeds 0.016 * 0.015 * 0.042 *** 0.039 *** 
pre-IPO alliances 0.019  0.020  -0.011  -0.006  
hi-tech industry 0.006  0.007  -0.006  -0.003  
ROA -0.013  -0.013  -0.001  -0.001  
board size 0.024 † 0.023 † 0.005  0.005  
TMT size -0.017  -0.017  -0.009  -0.003  
TMT tenure 0.010  0.010  0.002  0.000  
CEO turnover 0.001  0.001  -0.024 ** -0.024 * 
undergraduate prestige   -0.002    -0.004 * 
prestigious managerial experience   0.000    -0.012  
prestigious core role experience   0.009    0.002  
prestigious external directorates     0.006       0.011   
N 1683  1683  1683  1683  
# IPO Firms 379  379  379  379  
Chi-square 42.54  44.64  310.77  320.77  
Chi-square p-value <.001   0.002   <.001   <.001   
 † p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001  
Note:  Year dummies are included in these models, but are omitted from this table  
 
 
 
Formally stated, I hypothesized the following in Chapter II:  Hypotheses 9:  The 
positive relationship between managerial prestige at the time of a firm’s IPO and post-
IPO firm performance is positively and partially mediated by the number of post-IPO 
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strategic alliances that a newly public firm enters into with prestigious firms.  
Hypotheses 10:  The positive relationship between managerial prestige at the time of a 
firm’s IPO and post-IPO firm performance is positively and partially mediated by the 
amount of dedicated institutional investment in a newly public firm. 
In order to conduct empirical tests of Hypotheses 9 and 10 I utilized the approach 
outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  The Baron and Kenny (1986) approach for testing 
mediation consists of four steps.  First, a predictor variable must influence the outcome 
variable in the direction hypothesized (x Æ y).  Second, a predictor variable must 
influence the presumed mediator in the direction hypothesized (x Æ m).  Third, a 
mediator must influence the outcome variable in the hypothesized manner while 
controlling for the predictor variables (m Æ y).  Finally, a previously significant 
relationship between a predictor and the outcome variable must be reduced in the 
presence of the mediator.  Partial mediation is found when a previously significant 
relationship between a predictor and the outcome variable is reduced in the presence of 
the mediator, but still maintains statistical significance. 
The empirical evidence regarding support for Hypotheses 9 and 10 are found in 
the combined results of the tests of Hypotheses 1-8.  Following the Baron and Kenney 
(1986) logic I first examined the x Æ y relationships (Hypotheses 1-4) between 
managerial prestige and post-IPO firm performance outcome, growth and failure 
(Hypotheses 1-4).  As summarized in Table 2, I only found support for a positive 
relationship between undergraduate prestige and firm growth.  Next I examined the 
x Æ m relationships between the hypothesized aspects of managerial prestige and the 
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hypothesized mediators, prestigious alliance partners, and dedicated institutional 
investment (Hypotheses 7 & 8).  Table 2 shows that support for the hypothesized 
relationships was only found for undergraduate prestige and prestigious alliance 
partners.  Next, I examined the m Æ y relationships posited by Hypotheses 5 and 6.  As 
shown in Table 2, I only found support for the hypothesized relationships in the case of 
institutional investment stability and firm failure, and in the case of prestigious alliance 
partners and firm failure.  Given the results discussed above, I was unable to establish 
the pattern of relationships required by the Barron and Kenny approach.  As such, the 
combined results of prior hypothesis tests provide no support for Hypotheses 9 and 10. 
Summary 
This chapter presents the results of the tests of the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter III.  The empirical evidence regarding the hypothesized relationships may be 
summarized as follows.  First, a positive relationship between executive undergraduate 
prestige and post-IPO firm growth which provides partial support for Hypothesis 1.  
Second, no statistically significant relationship between executive prestigious firm 
managerial experience and post-IPO firm performance.  Third, no statistically significant 
relationships were found between prior core executive role experiences in prestigious 
firms and post-IPO firm performance, lending no support to Hypothesis 3.  Fourth, no 
statistically significant relationships were found between executive external directorates 
in prestigious firms and post-IPO firm performance, thereby showing no support for 
 110 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 4.  Fifth, a positive relationship was found between prestigious alliance 
partners and firm failure.  However, contrary to Hypothesis 5 a negative relationship was 
found between prestigious alliance partners and post-IPO firm growth.  Thus Hypothesis 
5 received partial support. 
Sixth, with respect to Hypothesis 6 no support was found for a relationship 
between institutional investment concentration and post-IPO firm performance.  Also 
regarding Hypothesis 6, a negative relationship was found between institutional 
investment stability and both IPO firm growth and failure.  The negative relationship for 
institutional investment stability was opposite the direction hypothesized.  Combined, 
these results provide partial support for Hypothesis 6.  Seventh, in partial support of 
Hypothesis 7, I found a positive relationship between executive undergraduate prestige 
and the number of alliances formed with prestigious firms.  Eighth, I found no support 
for Hypothesis 8.  The only statistically significant predictor I found in tests of 
Hypothesis 8 was executive undergraduate prestige, but its effect was opposite that of 
Hypothesis 8.  Finally, the combined results of Hypotheses 1-8 fail to meet the pattern of 
relationships prescribed by Baron and Kenny for partial mediation of the effects of 
managerial prestige on post-IPO firm performance by either of the mediators proposed 
in Hypotheses 9 and 10.  Thus, Hypothesis 9 and Hypothesis 10 were not supported.  
Having summarized the results of the hypothesis tests conducted in this study, I now 
shift my focus to providing some concluding remarks regarding this study.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I conclude this study by discussing the following topics.  First, I 
present a brief overview of the objectives of this study.  Second, I discuss the results 
presented in Chapter V and their implications for theory and managerial practice.  Third, 
I discuss the limitations of this study.  Finally, I present a discussion of avenues for 
extending and building upon this research in future. 
Discussion 
The influence of top executives on organizational outcomes has long interested 
researchers from a variety of academic disciplines.  This study has attempted to extend 
research on this topic in three primary ways.  First, this study examined the influence of 
managerial prestige on organizational outcomes.  With a few exceptions, this group of 
executive characteristics has received little attention in prior research.  Second, this 
study examined the influence of managerial prestige in a unique context, the time period 
following firm’s IPO.  Finally, this study has attempted to open the ‘black box’ of 
executive influence on organizational performance, by examining the potential mediated 
effects of managerial prestige’s influence on firm performance by identifying key 
external resource holders in the post-IPO context.  The results of hypothesis tests 
presented in Chapter V provide some noteworthy empirical evidence regarding the 
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theoretical model developed in Chapter III.  In the sections that follow I address the 
conclusions regarding the results of my hypothesis tests. 
Managerial Prestige and Post-IPO Firm Performance 
A central proposition of this study is that managerial prestige at the time of the 
IPO directly influences post-IPO firm performance.  Specifically, the model developed 
in Chapter III also posited positive relationships between executive educational prestige 
(Hypothesis 1), experience in prestigious firms (Hypothesis 2), core executive role 
experience in prestigious firms (Hypothesis 3), and prestigious external directorships 
(Hypothesis 4).  The arguments behind these hypotheses drew upon human capital 
(Becker, 1964, 1975), social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Coleman, 1988) and status 
characteristics (Berger et al., 1972; Ravlin & Thomas, 2005) theories to argue that such 
experiences provide executives with knowledge, skills, and social ties that are valuable 
in the post-IPO context.  In line with this view, I proposed that firm executives would be 
better equipped to deal with the adaptation and resource constraints presented by 
transitioning from being privately held to publicly traded.  Some support for this 
proposition was provided by the results of hypothesis tests discussed in Chapter V. 
In support of Hypothesis 1, this study found a positive relationship between 
executive undergraduate prestige and post-IPO firm growth.  To my knowledge, this is 
the first time a relationship between these two constructs has been documented.  This 
finding provides support for Carpenter et al.’s (2004) contention that upper echelons 
researchers should expand the set of executive characteristics beyond those commonly 
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examined.  This finding also provides some support for the logic articulated in Chapter 
III, that executive educational prestige represents a valuable source of firm human and 
social capital in the post-IPO context. 
It was also argued in this study’s theoretical model that managerial experience in 
prestigious firms also represents a valuable resource in the post-IPO context given the 
adaptation and resource constraints faced by newly public firms.  While the sign for the 
coefficients testing this hypothesis were in the directions proposed, they were not 
statistically significant.  This finding suggests that the amount of prior managerial 
experience in a prestigious firm possessed by firm executives at the time of the IPO has 
no influence on post-IPO firm performance. 
Prior core executive role experience in prestigious firms was also argued to 
represent a valuable firm resource in the post-IPO context.  The logic underlying this 
hypothesis was that such experience would provide firm executives with knowledge and 
skill useful in overseeing the organizational and structural changes required by the IPO 
transitions.  Additionally, I posited that such experiences would enhance organizational 
legitimacy.  Unfortunately, the empirical evidence presented in Chapter V does not 
support the logic underlying this hypothesis. 
Finally, the model developed in Chapter III posited a positive relationship 
between the possession of prestigious external directorate experience and post-IPO firm 
performance.  Specifically, I argued that such experiences provide managers with 
opportunities to learn about and observe the practices, policies and structures of the 
prestigious firms whose board they serve on.  In line with this logic, I posited that such 
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affiliations would contribute to the legitimacy of newly public firms.  However that 
empirical evidence presented in Chapter V lends no support to the theory behind this 
hypothesis. 
While the lack of support for the majority of the aspects of managerial prestige 
examined in this study was somewhat disappointing, it might not be surprising to some.  
Indeed, recent reviews of upper echelons research cited earlier in this study have found 
that establishing a consistent link between the characteristics of top managers and 
organizational performance has proven difficult (Carpenter et al., 2004; Certo et al., 
2006).  Prior researchers have suggested that one reason for this may be that a variety of 
intervening mechanisms may exist between the characteristics of members of the upper-
echelons and firm performance (Certo et al., 2006; Daily et al., 2003b).  Prior 
researchers have also suggested that the demographic proxies relied upon by upper 
echelons research such as this study do not adequately capture the underlying 
psychological constructs they are meant to proxy (Boal & Hooijberg, 2001; Priem et al., 
1999). 
On the other hand, the lack of support for the remaining aspects of the 
managerial prestige characteristics examined in this study may be surprising to others 
given that upper echelons theory (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 
1984) and research on transformational change (Amburgey et al., 1993; Fischer & 
Pollock, 2004) suggest that the post-IPO context examined in this study represents a 
context which should provide top executives with ample discretion and opportunity to 
influence subsequent firm performance outcomes.  In sum, this study has documented 
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that some aspects of managerial prestige do influence post-IPO firm performance.  In 
doing so this study has provided some support for the contention that upper echelons 
researchers should consider additional executive characteristics beyond those commonly 
examined in prior research.  In summary, while little empirical support was found for the 
managerial prestige hypotheses developed in this study, multiple methodological 
limitations may, in part, explain the lack of findings in this study.  Accordingly, these 
limitations are discussed in greater detail in the limitations section of this chapter. 
External Resource Holders and Post-IPO Firm Performance 
This study applied resource dependence theory and research on the 
transformational nature of the IPO transition to suggest that the support of key external 
resources holders would reduce the deleterious effects of the post-IPO transition on 
newly public firms.  Drawing upon prior research on transformational change, I 
identified dedicated institutional investors and prestigious strategic alliance partners as 
key external resource holders in the post-IPO context.  A discussion of the results 
regarding external resource holder support and post-IPO firm performance follows. 
First, this study finds that the having prestigious alliance partners is negatively 
associated with post-IPO firm failure.  This finding lends support to the idea that 
prestigious alliance partners provide newly public firms with enhanced access to 
information and resources that facilitates firm adaptation to the rigors of public trading.  
In contrast, however, this study also finds a negative relationship between prestigious 
alliance partners and post-IPO firm growth.  While the influence of prestigious alliance 
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partners on post-IPO firm growth and survival are juxtaposed against one another, the 
finding of these converse relationships may serve to highlight the tradeoffs firms face in 
pursuing firm survival and firm growth.  A more detailed discussion of the theoretical 
implications of this finding regarding these tradeoffs is provided in the section 
discussing the theoretical implications of this study. 
Second this study finds that having equity relationships with institutional 
investors whose portfolios are concentrated does not influence either post-IPO firm 
failure or growth.  Accordingly, having large amounts of firm equity owned by 
institutional investors with concentrated equity portfolios may not buffer newly public 
firms from pressures of public trading as proposed by the theoretical model developed in 
this study.  This suggests that potential monitoring benefits alluded to by Bushee (1998) 
may not be beneficial in the post-IPO context.  Rather, this finding may suggest that 
such monitoring benefits may be negated by excessive oversight which would actually 
serve to increase the pressure to manage firm earnings faced by the executives of newly 
public firms. 
In contrast, this study finds that equity relationships with institutional investors 
whose equity portfolios are stable are negatively related to both post-IPO firm survival 
and growth.  These findings parallel those regarding prestigious alliance partners and 
growth in that they suggest that the antecedents of firm failure and firm growth may 
differ.  Accordingly, these findings may also serve to demonstrate the tradeoffs inherent 
to firm growth and survival.  The finding of a negative association between firm equity 
relationships with institutional investors whose equity portfolios are stable provides 
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some support for the logic articulated in Chapter III.  Specifically, this finding provides 
some support for the view that dedicated institutional investors serve to buffer the 
executives of newly public firms from the earnings pressures typically faced by newly 
public firms. 
Managerial Prestige and External Resource Holder Support 
An additional aspect of the theoretical model developed in this study centers on 
the influence of managerial prestige characteristics in garnering the support of key 
external stakeholders.  Specifically, the theory developed in this study suggests that 
managerial prestige serves to reduce the liability of market newness faced by newly 
public firms, and as such key external resource holders will be more willing to transact 
with firms who employ prestigious managers.  However these arguments were largely 
unsupported.  This may not be surprising given the fact that this study measured 
managerial prestige at the time of the IPO and did not track it overtime.  As such, the 
lack of support for these hypotheses may be due to a limitation of this study rather than 
the theory it draws upon. 
An exception to the largely unsupportive results of this aspect of the model 
developed in this study was the finding of a positive relationship between executive 
undergraduate educational prestige and alliances with prestigious alliance partners.  I am 
unaware of any other studies that have documented such a relationship.  This result 
supports that logic underlying Hypothesis 8 that the human and social capital embodied 
in such educational credentials serves to overcome the liability of market newness faced 
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by newly public firms as they seek to acquire the support of key external resource 
holders in the post-IPO context.  In doing so, this characteristic of top management 
provides newly public firms with greater opportunity to enter alliances with prestigious 
partners. 
Partially Mediated Effects of Managerial Prestige on Post-IPO Firm Performance 
The final theoretical component to the model developed in this study focuses on 
the role of key external resource holders as partial mediators of the positive relationship 
between managerial prestige and post-IPO firm performance outcomes.  This aspect of 
the theory represents an attempt to explore the black box of the linkage between TMT 
characteristics and post-IPO firm performance outcomes referred to by Certo and 
colleagues (2006).  The discussion of the results of hypotheses tests presented in 
Chapter V concludes that no support was found for the mediated effects of the positive 
relationship between managerial prestige and post-IPO firm performance.   
The lack of support for this aspect of my theoretical model suggests that 
intervening mechanisms other than those identified in this study may be at play between 
the managerial prestige characteristics found to influence post-IPO firm performance.  
Consequently, future researchers may want to consider alternative intervening 
mechanisms between managerial prestige and firm performance outcomes.  For 
example, the buy, hold, or sell recommendations of stock analysts may represent another 
key external resource holder group in the post-IPO context.  Researchers may also 
consider ways to examine the influence of managerial prestige and external resource 
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holder support in a more longitudinal manner.  As discussed in the limitations section of 
this study, this study examined managerial prestige at the IPO. 
The lack of support for the mediated effects posited by the theoretical model 
developed in this study is largely a result of failure to establish the direct effects of 
managerial prestige posited by Hypotheses 1-4.  As such, the methodological limitations 
that may have precluded the finding of support for Hypotheses 1-4 may also represent 
reasons why no support was found for the mediated relationships hypothesized in this 
study.  A more detailed discussion of such limitations is presented in the section that 
follows. 
Limitations 
Like all research, this study is not without its limitations.  Accordingly, in this 
section I discuss the potential limitations of this study.  These limitations include, but 
may not be limited to, missing data issues, the use of demographic proxies for 
managerial prestige, reliance upon IPO prospectuses for executive experience data, 
construct measurement error, mis-specified models, sample generalizability, and 
potential confounds stemming from reverse causality and/or endogeneity. 
Missing Data 
Although this study relied upon multiple data sources, reliance upon archival 
data sources, presented some missing data issues.  This represents a common issue when 
relying upon archival data sources.  Missing data primarily occurred in the cases of pre-
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IPO firm financial data and institutional investment data.  While publicly traded firms 
and institutional investors are required to disclose these types of information to the SEC, 
privately held firms and private firm institutional investors are not.  As a result, missing 
pre-IPO financial data and institutional investment data were replaced with sample data 
as discussed in Chapter IV. 
Demographic Proxies 
Another limitation of this study is that I did not directly measure managerial 
prestige.  Extant research, as well as the theory and hypotheses developed in this study 
suggest that managerial is multidimensional latent theoretical construct.  As a result 
obtaining direct measures of managerial prestige can prove difficult.  Similar to prior 
studies on managerial prestige, in lieu of direct measures of managerial prestige, this 
study relied upon demographic proxies as measures of managerial prestige.  
Accordingly, this study suffers from the same limitations as other upper echelons 
research which relies upon demographic characteristics to serve as proxies for latent 
constructs.  Some suggests that individual demographic characteristics may not be 
entirely congruent with the underlying theoretical constructs they are intended to 
represent (Lawrence, 1997; Priem et al., 1999).  As such the results of this study should 
be interpreted with this potential limitation in mind. 
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IPO Prospectuses 
Solely relying upon IPO prospectuses as the source of managerial prestige 
characteristics presents another limitation of this study.  Specifically, firm managerial 
prestige characteristics were measures at the time of the IPO only.  While obtaining 
longitudinal measures of managerial prestige would have been ideal, the lack of data 
availability, and resource constraints precluded doing so in this study.  Additionally, as 
discussed in Chapter III, there exist multiple theoretically grounded reasons to suggest 
that managerial prestige at the time of a firm’s IPO will have an enduring effect on 
organizational outcomes (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Pollock et al., 2002).  The empirical 
results of this study provide some support for these theoretical arguments.   
Measurement Error 
This study may suffer from limitations regarding the measurement of key 
constructs.  For example, I was the only individual to code the executive experiences 
listed in each sample firm’s IPO prospectus.  Accordingly, it may be beneficial in the 
future to have additional raters code the executive experiences examined in this study in 
order to ensure data reliability.  Additionally, the measures of dedicated institutional 
investment proposed in this study, while adapted from Bushee (1998), are new and 
therefore warrant some inspection.  However, this approach to characterizing the nature 
of firm institutional investment rather than simply summing up the shares owned 
represents a methodological contribution beyond those to theory made by this study. 
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Mis-Specified Models 
Another potential limitation of this study may be that the models in this study are 
mis-specified.  For example, firm adaptation actions were not observable, and therefore 
not included as controls in the tests of this study’s hypotheses.  Such actions may 
represent a source of omitted variable bias in this study, given the importance of firm 
adaptation to the institutional environment presented in the post-IPO context.  
Additionally, the omission of outside director prestige may also represent a source of 
omitted variable bias.  Prior research suggests that the prestige of outside directors may 
also represent a valuable firm resource in the post-IPO context (Certo, 2003).  
Accordingly, key external resource holders may also focus on the characteristics of 
outside directors, in addition to those of a firm’s TMT.  In sum, firm adaptation actions, 
and outside director characteristics may represent sources of omitted variable bias, and 
as such, the results of this study should be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
Sample Generalizability 
A limited sample may represent an additional limitation of this study.  By 
utilizing only IPO firms that I was able to identify by firm name in both Jay Ritter’s IPO 
data and SDC, I have likely excluded some of the IPOs that occurred during 1997.  
Additionally, this sample only examines IPO firms that occurred during 1997.  As a 
consequence, the generalizability of this study may be limited.  In order to address this 
limitation, future research may consider ways to expand upon the sample utilized in this 
study. 
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Reverse Causality and Endogeneity 
Finally, the design and analytic tools used in this study do not preclude the 
potentially confounding issues of reverse causality or endogeneity regarding the 
relationships hypothesized in this study represent another limitation of this study.  In an 
attempt to partially remedy these issues, where possible I collected longitudinal data, and 
lagged them one year.  I also controlled for a variety of factors which extant research 
suggests may influence the outcomes of interest in this study. 
Implications 
The results of this study extend our understanding of the influence of top 
managers, equity owners, alliance partners and firm performance in several ways.  In the 
sections that follow I discuss the implications of these results for both theory and 
management practice. 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this study support the recommendation of Carpenter and 
colleagues (2004) that researchers need to expand the set of executive characteristics 
beyond those most commonly examined to upper echelons research.  Specifically, this 
study demonstrated that executive undergraduate prestige positively influenced firm 
performance.  Consequently, this study demonstrates the potential benefits of expanding 
the net of executive characteristics examined in upper echelons research. 
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The findings of this study also have implications for research on the 
transformational nature of the post-IPO period.  This study contributes to research in this 
area in two ways.  First, some of the results of this study support the contention of 
Fischer and Pollock (2004) that firm characteristics at the time of IPO can have an 
enduring impact on the long-term performance of newly public firms.  Second, the 
results of this study extend prior research in this area by identifying executive 
undergraduate prestige as an additional firm resource which aids firms as they cope with 
the challenges of transformational change. 
This study also contributes to research on the influence of institutional ownership 
on post-IPO organizational outcomes.  Prior research (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Higgins 
& Gulati, 2006) has alluded to potential linkages between the nature of firm institutional 
ownership and post-IPO firm performance.  However, this study is the first that I am 
aware of that has documented relationships between any aspect of dedicated institutional 
investment and post-IPO firm performance.  In doing so, this study highlights the 
importance of firm stockholders in shaping post-IPO firm performance outcomes.  
Particularly, this finding lends some support to the notion that institutional investors and 
the pressures they exert on top managers may influence subsequent firm performance 
outcomes.  This support, maybe tempered however, by potential endogeneity issues 
regarding institutional investor equity selection. 
An additional theoretical implication of this study pertains to research on 
strategic alliances.  The results of this study suggest that entering into alliances with 
publicly traded alliance partners enhance the survival chances of newly public firms, but 
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are negatively related to post-IPO growth.  This suggests that while alliances with public 
firms may provide newly public firms with opportunities for learning about the structure 
and routines which are necessary for functioning in public markets, they may also inhibit 
their ability to grow. 
In a related vein, this study indirectly sheds light into the research addressing the 
nature of the relationship between firm growth and other aspects of firm performance 
(Penrose, 1959).  In developing the theory and hypothesis tested in this study, I 
implicitly assumed that firm growth and survival outcomes would co-vary.  However the 
contradictory results of hypothesis test regarding the influence of prestigious alliance 
partners and institutional investment stability on firm survival and growth may 
disconfirm this assumption.  Consequently, the results of this study provide some 
support for theory which suggests firm growth and survival represent distinct theoretical 
constructs, whose antecedents differ (Delmar et al., 2003; Sapienza et al., 2006). 
Managerial Implications 
This research also provides at least two implications for management practice.  
First, the results of this study regarding the long-term performance implications of 
managerial prestige at the time of its IPO suggest the importance of exhibiting 
substantial care when configuring a firm’s TMT prior to its IPO.  Indeed, the results of 
this study combined with those of others (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) suggest that 
managerial characteristics at the time of the IPO may have an enduring effect on firm 
performance.  While at this point in the development of research in this area it would be 
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premature to make prescriptive recommendations, this study does suggest that decision 
makers may want to consider the source of educational credentials of prospective 
executives when making staffing decisions. 
Second, the conflicting results regarding the influence of institutional investment 
stability and prestigious alliance partners on firm survival and growth provide some 
implications for firm strategy.  These results may suggest that while the support of 
prestigious alliance partners and institutional investors with stable equity portfolios 
enhance a newly public firm’s survival chances, they may also reduce its rate of growth.  
Accordingly, managers may want to weigh these tradeoffs when during IPO road shows, 
and when considering prospective alliance partners. 
Future Research 
The results of this study also suggest areas that may be fruitful for future 
research.  First, this study examined the influence of managerial prestige at the time of 
the IPO.  Future research may consider ways to track managerial prestige as it evolves 
over time.  One approach to doing this would be to focus on managerial prestige changes 
associated with the title of CEO.  Researchers might examine how the characteristics of 
executives holding the title of CEO change as IPO CEOs turnover.  This approach would 
circumvent some of the data availability issues associated with examining the entire 
TMT longitudinally.  As mentioned in the limitations section, pursuing this opportunity 
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may serve to address issues of reverse causality and endogeneity associated with this 
study.  
Second, future research may consider extending this research by considering the 
influence of managerial prestige in contexts other than that immediately following the 
IPO.  In order to do so, researchers may look to incorporate the resource based view 
(Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), as this study has, in order to identify 
managerial status characteristics which are context relevant.  In doing so, our 
understanding regarding the context specific nature of managerial prestige would be 
enhanced. 
Third, this study might also be extended by applying the theory and measures of 
managerial prestige used in this research to IPO performance.  While some studies have 
examined the influence of D’Aveni’s (1990) measures of managerial prestige (i.e., 
Lester et al., 2006), I am unaware of any studies that have distinguished between ties to 
publicly traded firm and privately held firms when predicting IPO performance.  Given 
the challenges associated with adaptation to the public arena, it may be that IPO 
investors pay greater attention to ties to public firms than ties to privately held firms.  If 
such were the case, one would expect to find stronger relationships between ties to 
publicly traded firms and IPO outcomes than those to privately held firm. 
Fourth, this study might also be extended by considering potential contingencies 
to the relationships between managerial prestige examined in this study and post-IPO 
firm performance documented in this study.  For instance, environmental and 
technological uncertainty may increase external resource holders’ tendency to rely upon 
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managerial prestige characteristics as indicators of managerial competence and 
organizational legitimacy, thereby increasing their influence on post-IPO firm 
performance.  Pursuing this research opportunity would provide researchers with a better 
understanding of the boundary conditions of managerial prestige’s influence on post-IPO 
firm performance outcomes. 
Fifth, future research may build upon this study by considering the influence of 
additional external resource holders in the post-IPO context.  For instance, given the 
pressure faced by newly public firms to establish their legitimacy, the recommendations 
of stock analysts may play an important role in ensuring firm survival.  If such a 
relationship were established, researchers might also test to see if such recommendations 
mediate the relationship between managerial prestige characteristics and post-IPO firm 
performance.  Similar relationships might be explored for IPO proceeds, and secondary 
equity offerings as well. 
Examining the relationship between outside director prestige and post-IPO firm 
performance may represent another means of extending this study.  Resource 
dependence theory suggests that outside directors represent a key mechanism by which 
firms co-opt the support of key external resource holders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Additionally, prior research suggests that outside director prestige may serve to reduce 
the liability of market newness faced by newly public firms (Certo, 2003; Certo et al., 
2001b).  While tests of this view have not yielded conclusive results with regard to IPO 
performance, prior tests have not incorporated the distinction between ties to publicly 
traded firms and privately held firms.  Accordingly, researchers may consider this 
 129 
 
 
 
distinction when examining the influence of outside director prestige on both IPO and 
post-IPO firm performance. 
The results of this study also suggest that additional future research opportunities 
may also be found in examining the influence of institutional investment characteristics 
and other outcomes.  For instance researchers might examine the influence of 
institutional investor portfolio stability on such firm level outcomes as research and 
development spending, innovation, international diversification, as well as executive 
level outcomes such as compensation structure and turnover.  Such studies would 
increase our knowledge of the importance of firm equity owners and their 
characteristics. 
Summary 
As noted earlier in this study, the influence of top managers on organizational 
performance has long intrigued researchers from a variety of academic disciplines.  
Accordingly, a substantial amount of research has been conducted that attempts to link 
executive characteristics to firm performance outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996).  
The results of this body of research have are ambiguous (Carpenter et al., 2004; Certo et 
al., 2006).  This study attempted to extend research on top managers and firm 
performance by examining the direct and mediated influence of managerial prestige in 
the post-IPO context. 
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This study posited that executive educational prestige, managerial experience in 
prestigious firms, core executive role experience in prestigious firms, and prestigious 
external directorships would positively influence post-IPO firm performance.  The 
theoretical model developed in this study also identified dedicated institutional investors 
and prestigious alliance partners as potential mediators of the relationships posited by 
this study between managerial prestige and post-IPO firm performance.  As such, 
positive relationships were posited between the support of these external resource 
holders and post-IPO firm performance.  Additionally, the theory developed in this study 
proposed that the aspects of managerial prestige examined in this study would serve to 
garner the support of key external resource holders such as prestigious alliance partners 
and dedicated institutional investors.  Finally, the theoretical model developed in this 
study posited that the support of prestigious alliance partners and dedicated institutional 
investors partially mediates the relationship between managerial prestige and post-IPO 
firm performance. 
The results of this study provide some support for the arguments it articulates.  
First, executive educational prestige was found to positively influence post-IPO firm 
growth.  Second, prestigious alliance partners were found to be negatively related to firm 
failure.  Third, the amount of firm equity owned by institutional investors with stable 
equity portfolios was found to be negatively related to firm failure.  Finally, executive 
undergraduate prestige was found to be positively related to the formation of alliances 
with prestigious partners. 
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Although some support was found for the theory developed in this study, no 
support was found for relationships between executive managerial experience in 
prestigious firms, core executive role experience in prestigious firms, or prestigious 
external directorates and post-IPO firm performance.  Additionally, no support was 
found for the mediated relationships posited by the model developed in this study.  
Consequently, the lack of support for these hypothesized relationships potentially casts 
doubt upon the methodology and/or the theoretical arguments utilized in this study.  
While several of the hypotheses developed in this study were not supported, perhaps this 
study will lay a foundation for future research attempts to more fully understand the 
influence of top managers on the performance of the firms that employ them.
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